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CHAPTER II

FDA JURISDICTION: A
MATTER OF DEFINITIONS
A.

INTRODUCTION

The 1938 Act gave FDA authority over four broad categories of
products, all of which the agency still regulates: food, drugs, cosmetics, and
medical devices. In the ensuing decades, the agency assumed or was given
responsibility for additional classes of products, some of which (human
biological products, electronic radiation-emitting products) it continues to
regulate today, while other& (toys, pesticides) it later ceded to other
agencies. In addition, Congress has repeatedly tweaked the FD&C Act
definitions, in some instances establishing entire subcategories with their
own definitions, such as "food additives" and "dietary supplements" (both
subcategories of "food").
The scope of FDA' s power is defined almost entirely by the list of
product categories over which it has jurisdiction.* The statutory definitions
of these categories thus delineate the outer boundaries of the arena within
which the agency operates. The definitions are also important for another
reason. FDA has different degrees of power over different categories of
products. In general, the agency has greater authority over drugs, devices,
and biological products than over food and cosmetics. The category to
which FDA-or Congress-assigns an article thus largely controls the
shape of the regulatory regime the agency will impose on it.
As the materials in this chapter show, the product definitions are
strikingly broad and thus confer jurisdiction over a vast range of goods.
Furthermore, the definitions which are not mutually exclusive, are remarkably plastic, providing the agency with great flexibility to decide whether
and how to regulate products. Sometimes FDA has interpreted the definitions expansively, so as to expand its power. On other occasions, the agency
has construed the definitions narrowly, so as to avoid taking responsibility
for products it does not want to regulate or to minimize the burdensomeness of the requirements it does impose.
Occasionally, when FDA interprets the definitions flexibly so as to
achieve particular policy objectives, the courts will rein in the agency, as
the Supreme Court did with respect to FDA' s attempts in the 1990s to
regulate cigarettes as medical devices. FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529
*[The most important exception to this
principle is the power FDA shares with the
Centers for Disease Control under Section

361 of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 264) to take measures to control the
spread of communicable diseases.

28

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097623

A

INTRODUCTION

U.S. 120 (2000), infra p. 82. In general, however, as the next case illustrates, courts have granted the agency considerable latitude in applying the
product definitions.

United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk
394 U.S. 784 (19691.

•MR. CHIEF JuSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the court.
At issue here is the scope of the statutory definition of drug contained
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the extent of the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare's regulatory authority under
that definition. The specific item involved in this definitional controversy is
a laboratory aid known as an antibiotic sensitivity disc, used as a screening
test for help in determining the proper antibiotic drug to administer to
patients. If the article is a "drug"
then the Secretary can subject it to
pre-market clearance regulations promulgated pursuant to § 507 of the
Act.
If, on the other hand, the article is merely a "device" under the
Act, it is subject only to the misbranding and adulteration proscriptions of
the Act and does not have to be pretested before marketing; and, of course,
if the disc does not fall under either definition, the Act itself is totally
inapplicable ..
At the outset, it is clear from § 201 that the word "drug" is a term of
art for the purposes of the Act, encompassing far more than the strict
medical definition of that word.
The historical expansion of the definition of drug, and the creation of a
parallel concept of devices, clearly show, we think, that Congress fully
intended that the Act's coverage be as broad as its literal language
indicates and equally clearly, broader than any strict medical definition
might otherwise allow. Strong indications from legislative history that
Congress intended the broad coverage the District Court thought "ridiculous" should satisfy us that the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the
Act's language as written. But we are all the more convinced that we must
give effect to congressional intent in view of the well-accepted principle
that remedial legislation such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be
given a liberal construction consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to
protect the public health, and specifically, § 507's purpose to ensure that
antibiotic products marketed serve the public with "efficacy" and "safety."
Respondent's alternative contention, that even if its product does fall
within the purview of the Act, it is plainly a "device" and therefore by
definition necessarily not a "drug/' must also be rejected, we believe, in
light of the foregoing analysis. At the outset, it must be conceded that the
language of the statute is of little assistance in determining precisely what
differentiates a "drug" from a "device": to the extent that both are
intended for use in the treatment, mitigation and cure of disease, the
former is an "article" and the latter includes "instruments," "apparatus,"
and "contrivances." Despite the obvious areas of overlap in definition, we
are not entirely without guidance in determining the propriety of the
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Secretary's decision below, given the overall goals of the Act and its
legislative history.
More specifically, ... the "natural way" to draw the line "is in light of
the statutory purpose." Since the patient will tend to derive less benefit
and perhaps some harm from a particular antibiotic if, though the drug
itself was properly batch-tested, it was not the proper antibiotic to use, it
was entirely reasonable for the Secretary to determine that the discs, like
the antibiotics they serve, are drugs and similarly subject to pre-clearance
certification under § 507. An opposite conclusion might undercut the value
of testing the antibiotics themselves, for such testing would be a useless
exercise if the wrong drug were ultimately administered, even partially as
the result of an unreliable disc ....
Reversed.

B. Foon
Section 20l(D of the FD&C Act defines "food" as follows: "The term
'food' means (1) articles used for food and drink for man or other animals,
(2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article."
Not surprisingly, this tautological definition ("food" means "food") leaves
many open questions. The issue of the definition's precise meaning has
sometimes arisen in disputes over whether a particular product is a food or
falls outside FDA's authority altogether. On other occasions, as in the case
excerpted below, the question has come up when FDA has tried to regulate
as a drug a product that the manufacturer claims is only a food. Because
new drugs are subject to premarket approval by the agency for safety and
effectiveness, whereas foods are not, the resolution of such a dispute over
application of the food definition frequently determines the fate of the
product.

Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker
713 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1983) .
• CUMMINGS, CHIEF JUDGE.

Plaintiffs manufacture and market a product known as "starch blockers" which "block" the human body's digestion of starch as an aid in
controlling weight. On July 1, 1982, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") classified starch blockers as "drugs" and requested that all such
products be removed from the market until FDA approval was received ....
The only issue on appeal is whether starch blockers are foods or drugs
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Starch blocker tablets
and capsules consist of a protein which is extracted from a certain type of
raw kidney bean. That particular protein functions as an alpha-amylase
inhibitor; alpha-amylase is an enzyme produced by the body which is
utilized in digesting starch. When starch blockers are ingested during a
meal, the protein acts to prevent the alpha-amylase enzyme from acting,

B

FOOD

thus allowing the undigested starch to pass through the body and avoiding
the calories that would be realized from its digestion.
Kidney beans, from which alpha-amylase inhibitor is derived, are
dangerous if eaten raw. By August 1982, FDA had received seventy-five
reports of adverse effects on people who had taken starch blockers, including complaints of gastro-intestinal distress such as bloating, nausea, abdominal pain, constipation and vomiting. Because plaintiffs consider starch
blockers to be food, no testing as required to obtain FDA approval as a new
drug has taken place. If starch blockers were drugs, the manufacturers
would be required to file a new drug application pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 and remove the product from the marketplace until approved as a
drug by the FDA.
The statutory scheme under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a
complicated one. Section 321(g)(l) provides that the term "drug" means
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles
intended for use as a component of any article specified in clauses
(A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph; but does not include devices or
their components, parts, or accessories.
The term "food" as defined in Section 321(D means
(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2)
chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such
article.
Section 32l(g)(l)(C) was added to the statute in 1938 to expand the
definition of "drug." The amendment was necessary because certain articles intended by manufacturers to be used as drugs did not fit within the
"disease" requirement of Section 321(g)(l)(B). Obesity in particular was
not considered a disease. Thus "anti-fat remedies" marketed with claims of
"slenderizing effects" had escaped regulation under the prior definition ...
It is well established that the definitions of food and drug are normally
not mutually exclusive; an article that happens to be a food but is intended
for use in the treatment of disease fits squarely within the drug definition
in part B of Section 321(g)(l) and may be regulated as such. Under part C
of the statutory drug definition, however, "articles (other than food)" are
expressly excluded from the drug definition (as are devices) in Section
32l(g)(l)* In order to decide if starch blockers are drugs under Section
321(g)(l)(C), therefore, we must decide if they are foods within the meaning of the part C "other than food" parenthetical exception to Section
321(g)(l)(C). And in order to decide the meaning of "food" in that parenthetical exception, we must first decide the meaning of "food" in Section
321(D.
*[Authors' Note: the definition of
"drug" at 21 U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l) no longer
explicitly excludes devices. l
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Congress defined "food" in Section 321(D as "articles used as food."
This definition is not too helpful, but it does emphasize that "food" is to be
defined in terms of its function as food, rather than in terms of its source,
biochemical composition or ingestibility. Plaintiffs' argument that starch
blockers are food because they are derived from food-kidney beans-is not
convincing; if Congress intended food to mean articles derived from food it
would have so specified. Indeed some articles that are derived from food are
indisputably not food, such as caffeine and penicillin. In addition, all
articles that are classed biochemically as proteins cannot be food either,
because for example, insulin, botulism toxin, human hair and influenza
virus are proteins that are clearly not food.
Plaintiffs argue that 21 U.S.C. § 3430) specifying labeling requirements for food for special dietary uses indicates that Congress intended
products offered for weight conditions to come within the statutory definition of "food." Plaintiffs misinterpret that statutory section. It does not
define food but merely requires that if a product is a food and purports to
be for special dietary uses, its label must contain certain information to
avoid being misbranded. If all products intended to affect underweight or
overweight conditions were per se foods, no diet product could be regulated
as a drug under Section 32l(g)(l)(C), a result clearly contrary to the intent
of Congress that "anti-fat remedies" and "slenderizers" qualify as drugs
under that Section.
If defining food in terms of its source or defining it in terms of its
biochemical composition is clearly wrong, defining food as articles intended
by the manufacturer to be used as food is problematic. When Congress
meant to define a drug in terms of its intended use, it explicitly incorporated that element into its statutory definition. For example, Section
32l(g)(l)(B) defines drugs as articles "intended for use" in, among other
things, the treatment of disease; Section 32l(g)(l)(C) defines drugs as
"articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals." The definition of food in Section
32l(D omits any reference to intent .... Further, a manufacturer cannot
avoid the reach of the FDA by claiming that a product which looks like food
and smells like food is not food because it was not intended for consumption. In United States v. Technical Egg Prods., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 326 (N.D.
Ga. 1959), the defendant argued that the eggs at issue were not adulterated
food under the Act because they were not intended to be eaten. The court
held that there was a danger of their being diverted to food use and
rejected defendant's argument.
Although it is easy to reject the proffered food definitions, it is difficult
to arrive at a satisfactory one. In the absence of clearcut Congressional
guidance, it is best to rely on statutory language and common sense. The
statute evidently uses the word "food" in two different ways. The statutory
definition of "food" in Section 32l(D is a term of art and is clearly intended
to be broader than the common-sense definition of food, because the
statutory definition of "food" also includes chewing gum and food additives. Food additives can be any substance the intended use of which
results or may reasonably [be expected to] result in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 32l(s). Paper food-packaging when containing polychlorinated biphenyls

B Fooo
, I'( ~B's),

for example, is an adulterated food because the PCB's may
>01grnte from the package to the food and thereby become a component of
'1
Yet the statutory definition of "food" also includes in Section
::~ l(l)(l) the common-sense definition of food. When the statute defines
·rood" as "articles used for food," it means that the statutory definition of
rood" includes articles used by people in the ordinary way most people use
1.. od-primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive value. To hold as did the
>I istrict court that articles used as food are articles used solely for taste,
:1roma or nutritive value is unduly restrictive since some products such as
··offee or prune juice are undoubtedly food but may be consumed on
1 iccasion for reasons other than taste, aroma, or nutritive value.
This double use of the word "food" in Section 321(!) makes it difficult
Io interpret the parenthetical "other than food" exclusion in the Section
::2l(g)(l)(C) drug definition. As shown by that exclusion, Congress obviously meant a drug to be something "other than food," but was it referring to
'"food" as a term of art in the statutory sense or to foods in their ordinary
meaning? Because all such foods are "intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals" and would thus come
within the part C drug definition, presumably Congress meant to exclude
common-sense foods. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide this question
here because starch blockers are not food in either sense.* The tablets and
pills at issue are not consumed primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive
value under Section 321(!)(1); in fact, as noted earlier, they are taken for
their ability to block the digestion of food and aid in weight loss. In
addition, starch blockers are not chewing gum under Section 321(!)(2) and
are not components of food under Section 321(!)(3). To qualify as a drug
under Section 321(g)(l)(C), the articles must not only be articles "other
than food," but must also be "intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals." Starch blockers indisputably
satisfy this requirement for they are intended to affect digestion in the
people who take them. Therefore, starch blockers are drugs under Section
~21(g)(l)(C) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
Affirmed.

NOTES
1. Dual Classification. It is indisputable that a product fitting the common
sense definition of a "food" in section 201(f) is also subject to regulation as a drug
*The FDA urges an interpretation of the
:->tatute that would allow drug regulation of a
product if, for example, an appetite suppressant were added to a recognized food. According to the FDA, addition of the drug might
1nake it a "component" and therefore subject
to regulation as a statutory "food". A::. such,
the literal language of Section 321(g)(l)(C)
would preclude regulation as a drug because
the product would qualify as a statutory
"food''. Even if Section 321(g)(l)(C) meant
1Jnly to exclude common-sense foods, an article might still be considered food unless addil ion of an appetite suppressant so changed its

nature that it was no longer used primarily
for taste, aroma or nutritional value. The
FDA submits that a drug manufacturer could
easily escape drug regulation by simply adding the drug to a food.
It is not necessary to resolve this problem in order to resolve this case. We merely
note the possibility that the word "component" might be interpreted to exclude substances specifically added to a food to avoid
bringing the substance within the drug definition, and, as noted above, a food may lose
its food character if a drug is added.
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under section 201(g)(l)(B) if the manufacturer makes a therapeutic claim for it. See
Senate Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1935). In American Health Products
Co., Inc. v. Hayes, 574 F. Supp. 1498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case brought about the same
time as Nutrilab by a different starchblocker manufacturer, the government advanced a bolder argument. It contended that a food is subject to dual classification,
even in the absence of a therapeutic claim, if there is a claim regarding a specific
physiological effect (that is, a structure or function claim). The United States
asserted that a product making such a claim falls outside the food exclusion from
section 201(g)(l)(C)'s definition of "drug," even if it is also a common sense food
under section 201(1). Although the District Court held for the government on the
same grounds as the Seventh Circuit in Nutrilab, it rejected FDA's argument as to
dual classification.
The government's contention [in favor of dual classification] is untenable. Though most sections of the Act countenance dual classification, no
other contains a parenthetical like that Congress inserted in part (C).
Ignoring that parenthetical would render meaningless the distinctions
Congress has attempted to delineate. Nevertheless, the government is
correct in claiming that starchblocker pills are a "drug" under the Act,
because the pills are not a "food" in any sense cognizable under the
statute ..
In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit specifically stated that ''we do not
reach the issue whether dual classification is appropriate under section
32l(g)(l)(C)." American Health Prods. Co. v. Hayes, 744 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
2. Caffeine. FDA regulates over-the-counter stimulants in which caffeine is
the active ingredient as drugs. 21 C.F.R. Part 340. However, when caffeine is added
to food, such as a soft drink, the agency does not regulate the product as a drug
even if the manufacturer promotes the food's high level of caffeine and its "energizing" qualities. Apparently, in FDA's view, such products fall within the food
exception to the structure/function drug definition in section 20l(g)(l)(C).
3. The Impact of DSHEA. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
of 1994 (DSHEA) amended the FD&C Act in a way that dramatically changed the
categorization question for products such as starchblockers. A product that satisfies
DSHEA's definition of a "dietary supplement" is now automatically classified as a
food, regardless of whether it satisfies Nutrilab's "common sense" test. Indeed,
i'starch-blocking" amylase inhibitors derived from kidney beans are currently
marketed as dietary supplements, and thus as foods. Nonetheless, for products that
do not qualify as dietary supplements under DSHEA, Nutrilab's "common sense"
definition of food still applies. DSHEA is addressed in detail below, infra p. 260.
4. Structure/Function Claims Versus Disease Claims. The line between structure/function claims and disease claims can be a maddeningly indistinct one.
Nevertheless, FDA did not set forth a comprehensive analysis of the distinction
until 2000. We consider the agency's assessment of the difference between the types
of claims, infra p. 276.

COMMENT: OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE DEFINITION OF
"FOOD"
Food Additives. As explained by the Nutrilab court, the distinction
between a food and a drug is critical because new drugs, unlike conventional foods, are subject to the requirement of premarket approval by FDA. The
manufacturer of a new drug must establish to FDA that its product is safe
and effective before the agency will approve it. Observe, however, that
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is a subcategory of foods, called "food additives," that are subject to a
premarket safety approval by the agency. The definition of food in section
~Ol(D includes "articles used for components" of food or drink. As set forth
111 section 20l(s) of the FD&C Act, "The term 'food additive' means any
"1 bstance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise
affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such substance is not
µ;enerally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate its safety
to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use." The exemption for foods that are generally recognized as
safe (GRAS) frees most conventional food ingredients from the requirement
of premarket approval. Section 20l(s) also lists a number of specific
exceptions to the definition of "food additive." This section is examined in
detail infra Chapter III.
Migrating Food-Contact Materials. The statutory definition of food
includes substances that migrate to food from food packaging and dinnerware, even before such migration takes place. Natick Paperboard Corp. v.
Weinberger, 525 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1975); United States u. Articles of Food
Consisting of Pottery .. Labeled Cathy Rose, 370 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
Chewing Gum. Section 201(0(2) of the FD&C Act specifically classifies
chewing gum as food. As a result, FDA has taken the position that when
snuff is included in a masticatory carrier base, which has the appearance of
a piece of confectionary, it is properly regulated as a food. See Letter from
FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs J.M. Taylor to S.M.
Pape (Apr. 11, 1988).
No Longer "Fit" Food. A product is a food under the Act if it is
generally regarded as food when sold in food form even if it is decomposed
or otherwise unfit for food at the time FDA institutes legal action against
it. See, e.g., United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974);
Otis McAllister & Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States u. O.F. Bayer & Co., 188 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v. 52
Drums Maple Syrup, 110 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1940); United States v. Technical Egg Products, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1959); United States v.
Thirteen Crates of Frozen Eggs, 215 F. 584 (2d Cir. 1914). See also
Annotation: What is "Food" Within Meaning of Statute, 17 A.L.R. 1282
(1922).

COMMENT: OTHER AGENCIES' ROLES IN REGULATING FOOD
Several categories of food products are subject to specific regulatory
requirements.
Meat, Poultry, and Eggs. These products are regulated by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq., the Poultry Products Inspection Act,
21 U.S.C. 451 et seq., and the Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. 1031
et seq. USDA has ceded to FDA jurisdiction over any food that is less than
two percent meat or poultry. The jurisdiction of USDA and FDA over these
three categories of food products is otherwise complex and uncertain. FDA
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has exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over live animals intended to be used
for food. United States v. Tomahara Enterprises, Ltd., Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,217 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). USDA has exclusive jurisdiction over
the slaughter of food animals and over the subsequent processing of meat
and poultry, except that USDA and FDA have joint jurisdiction over the
use of food additives in meat and poultry. After processing, USDA and FDA
have joint jurisdiction over the distribution of meat and poultry up to the
retail establishment where it is sold. FDA has exclusive jurisdiction over
retail food establishments. D& W Food Centers, Inc. v. Block, 786 F.2d 751
(6th Cir. 1986), held that a central kitchen making pizza containing meat
was not subject to the continuous inspection requirements of the Federal
Meat Inspection Act. See generally Food Regulation: A Case Study of USDA
and FDA, in "Study on Federal Regulation: Regulatory Organization,"
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. V, at
Ch. 4 (Comm. Print 1977).
The FMIA has long applied to the meat of only five named species
(cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and equines), and not to meat of other species
such as rabbit, venison, or bison, which remained within FDA's purview.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 601(j) (definition of "meat food product"). In 2005,
however, Congress, as part of the FY 2006 Agriculture Appropriations bill,
119 Stat. 2120, amended the FMIA to extend the USDA inspection system
to all "amenable species," defined as the above species plus "any additional
species of livestock that the Secretary considers appropriate." 21 U.S.C.
601(w)(2).
FDA has primary responsibility for the safety and labeling of shell
eggs, although the voluntary grading of shell eggs is done under USDA
supervision. Egg processing plants that wash, sort, break, and pasteurize
eggs are under USDA jurisdiction, as are processed products known for
their egg content.
Alcoholic Beverages. The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(TTB) of the Department of the Treasury has jurisdiction over alcoholic
beverages under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977
(1935), codified in 27 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms in the Department of the Treasury formerly performed this
function, but the Homeland Security Act of 2002 shifted certain law
enforcement responsibilities of BATF to the Department of Justice and
kept tax and trade regulation within a newly-named unit of the Treasury
Department. TTB regulates all beer products regardless of their alcohol
content. 51 Fed. Reg. 39666 (Oct. 30, 1986). In contrast, TTB regulates
only those wine products that contain 7 percent alcohol or more, and FDA
regulates all wine products containing less than 7 percent alcohol. FDA
Compliance Policy Guide No. 7101.05 (Oct. 1, 1980). Attempts to amend
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act to extend the Department of the
Treasury's jurisdiction to wine products containing as little as 0.5 percent
alcohol have been unsuccessful. Accordingly, wine coolers, which have an
alcohol content of less than 7 percent, are regulated by FDA rather than
TTB.
One court has held that the labeling of alcoholic beverages (except for
wine products containing less than 7 percent alcohol) is subject only to
~
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I \ATF (now TTB) jurisdiction and is exempt from the labeling requirements of the FD&C Act. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F.
Slipp. 5 (W.D. Ky. 1976). In other respects, however, alcoholic beverages
are regulated as food by FDA, although the two agencies have a memorandum of understanding that confirms TTB's primary responsibility for
overseeing voluntary recalls of adulterated products. See FDA Compliance
Policy Guide No. 7155.04 (Nov. 1987); Elaine T. Byszewski, What's in the
Wine? A History of FDA's Role, 57 Foon & DRUG L.J. 545 (2002); Iver P.
Cooper, The FDA, the BATF, and Liquor Labeling: A Case Study of
Interagency Jurisdictional Conflict, 34 Foon DRUG CosM. L.J. 370 (1979);
Mary Hancock, Federal Jurisdictional Disputes in the Labeling and Advertising of Malt Beverages, 34 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 271 (1979); Symposium
on Alcoholic Beverage Control, 7 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 543 (1940). FDA
has also adopted Compliance Policy Guide 7101.04, 54 Fed. Reg. 38559
(Sept. 19, 1989), governing the labeling of dealcoholized wine beverages.
Water and Ice. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660
(1974), general responsibility for the purity of drinking water was placed in
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but section 410 was added to
the FD&C Act to preserve FDA's jurisdiction over bottled drinking water.
The agency also has jurisdiction over ice. See C.W. Felix, Ice-the Forgotten
Food, 53 J. Ass'N Foon & DRuG OFFICIALS 19 (July 1989). Water used to
process food or as an ingredient in food is subject to the same requirements
under the FD&C Act as any other food constituent.

C.

COSMETICS

Section 201(i) of the FD&C Act defines "cosmetic" as "(l) articles
intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or
otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing,
beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance, and (2)
articles intended for use as a component of any such articles; except that
such term shall not include soap." Cosmetics are the least intensively
regulated of all the product categories under FDA's jurisdiction. There is no
premarket approval requirement for any cosmetic or cosmetic ingredient,
with the exception of color additives. But, like foods, cosmetics may be
simultaneously classified as drugs. Moreover, because the structure/function leg of the drug definition, section 201(g)(l)(C), does not contain an
exception for cosmetics, as it does for food, a cosmetic may be dualclassified as a drug even if it is a nontherapeutic product intended only to
affect the structure or any function of the body. The question of when a
cosmetic is also a drug is addressed later in this chapter, infra p. 48.
Section 201(i)-the "cosmetic" definition itself-has raised relatively
few interpretive questions. Even so, several features of this provision
deserve further discussion.

NOTES
1. Odors. FDA considers products intended to inask or prevent body odors,
such as mouthwashes and underarm deodorants, to be cosmetics.
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2. Soap Exemption. The FD&C Act does not define "soap." FDA has defined
the scope of the soap exemption by regulation. According to the agency, the
exemption applies only to articles that meet the following conditions: "(1) The bulk
of the nonvolatile matter in the product consists of an alkali salt of fatty acids and
the detergent properties of the article are due to the alkali-fatty acid compounds;
and (2) The product is labeled, sold, and represented only as soap." 23 Fed. Reg.
7483 (Sept. 26, 1958), codified at 21 C.F.R. 701.20. If a product is intended not only
for cleansing but also for other cosmetic uses, such as beautifying, moisturizing, or
deodorizing, FDA will regulate it as a cosmetic. The exemption is thus quite narrow,
and most products on the soap shelves of stores are cosmetics. In United States v.
An Article of Cosmetic
Beacon Castile Shampoo, 1969-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 149
(N.D. Ohio 1973), the court held that the claimant had the burden of proving the
product fell within the soap exemption. The court acknowledged that a shampoo
made from soap would fall within that exemption, but concluded that the claimant's
shampoo did not qualify because it contained a synthetic detergent.
A soap-like product may also be a drug if it is intended to cure, treat or prevent
disease or to affect the structure or any function of the human body. It remains
unclear whether simply calling a soap product "antibacterial" renders it a drug, see
infra p. 57, but any explicit therapeutic claims indisputably place a soap product in
the drug category.
3. Tattoos. FDA regulates the inks used in tattoos and permanent makeup as
cosmetics and the pigments used in these inks as color additives. Office of Cosmetics
& Colors Fact Sheet: Tattoos & Permanent Makeup, Nov. 29, 2000. FDA, however,
does not regulate the actual practice of tattooing; instead, oversight is left to local
laws and jurisdictions.
4. Animal Cosmetics. The FD&C Act's definition of "cosmetic" is limited to
articles intended to be applied to the "human body." Products intended to cleanse
or promote the attractiveness of animals thus fall outside FDA's control. Cf United
States v. Articles of Drug for Veterinary Use ... Goshen Laboratories, Inc., Food
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,174 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (claimant argued that the
veterinary products involved were "canine cosmetics" not subject to the FD&C Act,
but court concluded the articles were animal drugs under FDA control). By
contrast, the FD&C Act's definitions of "food," "drug," and "device" (but not the
definition of "biological product" in the Public Health Service Act) refer to "man or
other animals."
5. Cosmetic Foods. Because breath freshening is a cosmetic effect, the line
between foods and cosmetics can ;'ometimes be elusive. For example, some dissolvable "breath strips" have been labeled as foods, whereas most are now labeled as
cosmetics. FDA apparently has not voiced its opinion on the proper categorization of
these products.

COMMENT: ARE COSMETIC DEVICES "COSMETICS"?
Are combs, nail files, or razor blades "cosmetics"? The requirement that a
cosmetic be ''rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise
applied to the human body" seems to exclude many common household implements
from the definition, despite their cosmetic uses. Indeed, prior to the passage of the
FD&C Act, a Senate report considering this language declared, "[T]he definition of
the term cosmetic does not include devices .... " S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1935). Nevertheless, until the early 1960s, FDA, on rare occasions, took
legal action against household devices such as hair brushes, stockings, and toothpicks under the cosmetic provisions of the Act. In more recent decades, although the
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'.(·ncy has never explicitly disclaimed its authority to classify such products as
, "-'"'1netics, it has declined to assert jurisdiction over them.

In 2003, FDA took regulatory action against a type of device under the
,-u_-..;1netics provisions of the Act, apparently for the first time in many years. FDA
d1·clared that noncorrective decorative contact lenses were not medical devices, see
, 11 fi·a p. 61, but it simultaneously asserted that they qualified as cosmetics and
\1·1 iuld be regulated as such. The agency observed that "decorative contact lenses are
.1rticles intended to be introduced into the eye, which is a part of the body, to
li1 ·autify the wearer, promote the attractiveness of the wearer, or alter the wearer's

.q>pearance." 68 Fed. Reg. 16520, 16521 (Apr. 4, 2003). In asserting that these
pl'oducts were cosmetics, the agency observed: "The fact that contact lenses are
·devices' in the colloquial sense does not preclude cosmetic status under the act.
l•'DA has previously determined that section 201(i) of the act applies to appearance('nhancing devices such as wigs, hair brushes, stockings and toothpicks." Later that
yl~ar, FDA sent a warning letter to a distributor of decorative contact lenses,
;1:-;serted that the lenses were adulterated cosmetics (because they were distributed
without the involvement of a qualified eye care professional) and misbranded
(·osmetics (because their labeling failed to include sufficient instructions or warnings). Warning Letter from 'rimothy Ulatowski, Director, CDRH Office of Compliance, to BWild Inc. (Sept. 16, 2003). The agency has since sent similar letters to at
least two other distributors of decorative contact lenses.
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In general, drugs and devices are subject to much more rigorous
regulatory regimes than food or cosmetics. Most important, since 1938,
"new drugs" have been subject to premarket approval, and since 1976,
many medical devices have been subject to either premarket approval or to
the requirement that their manufacturers demonstrate that they are substantially equivalent to products already on the market. Consequently, a
determination that a product is a drug or device is often tantamount to a
determination that the product cannot be sold at all until FDA approves it
for marketing.
Section 20l(g)(l) of the FD&C Act defines "drug" as follows:
The term ''drug'' means
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or
official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
and
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals; and
(D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C) ....
Section 20l(h) of the FD&C Act defines "device" as follows:
The term "device"
means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other
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similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,

(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals,
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and
which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
The Act's definitions of drug and device are parallel in many respects.
This chapter focuses primarily on their common elements, while the
distinctions between drugs and devices are considered in Chapter VII,
which examines device regulation.

1.

INCLUSION IN OFFICIAL COMPENDIA

Section 321(g)(l)(A) of the Act includes within the definition of "drug"
any article "recognized in the official United States Pharmacopeia, official
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them." The definition of "device"
contains a parallel provision. See FD&C Act 32l(h)(l).
The United States Pharmacopeia and National Formulary (USP-NF)
is a compendium of standards for drug strength, quality, purity, packaging,
labeling, and storage, published by the United States Pharmacopeia (USP),
a nongovernmental organization more than a century old. The National
Formulary was published separately by the American Pharmaceutical Association until 1975, when USP acquired the NF and combined the two
publications under one cover. In addition to products universally viewed as
drugs, the USP-NF also contains standards for most vitamins and minerals. The Homeopathic Pharmacopeia contains many herbal products.
Although section 32l(g)(l)(A) appears on its face to give FDA the
power to treat any item listed in these compendia as a drug, the agency
generally has not viewed this provision so expansively. When FDA has
attempted to regulate products as drugs based solely on their inclusion in
the USP or NF, courts have usually thwarted these efforts. Compare
National Nutritional Foods Assoc. v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 788-89 (2d Cir.
1974) (rejecting argument that vitamins and minerals are drugs because of
their recognition in the official compendia); National Nutritional Foods
Association v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 337-38 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the
argument with regard to high potency vitamins); and U.S. v. An Article of
Drug ... Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), affd without op. 535 F.2d
1248 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting the argument with regard to pregnancy test
kit), with U.S. v. Articles of Drug ... Beuthanasia, Food Drug Cosm. L.
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&p. (CCH) ~ 38,265 (D. Neb. 1979) (accepting the argument with regard to
animal euthanasia drug).
In U.S. v. Ova II, a federal district court considering the regulatory
status of a pregnancy test concluded that the official compendia provision
of the drug definition "cannot be taken literally," because a literal interpretation would "run[ ] afoul of the principle that a legislative body may
not lawfully delegate its functions to a private citizen or organization."
Nonetheless, the court observed that the inclusion of a product in such a
compendium has real, if limited, legal significance.
[T]he first definition, i.e., recognition in the U.S.P. or other named
compendium must be read to mean that:
(a) an article put into the stream of interstate commerce with
the intention that it be used for medicinal purposes, as evidenced
by the label designation "U.S.P.," "N.F.," and the like, must meet
the privately designated standards for quality and strength, or else
be subject to appropriate action for misbranding or adulteration;
(b) the recognition of an item in the U.S.P., etc., by a monograph, coupled with a label indicating compliance with standards,
constitutes evidence that the item is a "drug" as a matter of prima
facie proof only, calling on the opposing party to come forward
with contrary evidence or else risk an adverse ruling;
(d) an item recognized in U.S.P., etc., such as sodium hydroxide, hydrochloric acid, or whatever, by name, is not a drug if it is
put into the channels of interstate commerce without a label such
as "U.S.P.," "N.F." and the like, to imply that it is intended for
medicinal use.
414 F. Supp. at 665-66.
For a further analysis of the official compendia provision of the drug
definition, see National Nutritional Foods Ass'n u. Mathews, infra p. 42.

2.

"INTENDED UsE" AND THE FooD-DRUG SPECTRUM

The most important similarity between the definitions of "drug" and
"device" is their common reference to "intended" use. In most instances, if
a product is ''intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention" of disease or is "intended to affect the structure or function
of the body," it is either a drug or a device. Not surprisingly, there have
been countless disputes over the meaning of "intent" and over the types of
evidence required to establish intent.
For both drugs and devices, FDA has used the following regulatory
definition of "intended use" since 1952:
The words intended uses or words of similar import
refer to
the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the
labeling of drugs. The intent is determined by such persons'
expressions or may be shown by the circumstances surrounding
the distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for
example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral
or written statements by such persons or their representatives. It

41

42

CHAPTER II

FDA JURISDICTION, A MATTER OF DEFINITIONS

may be shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the
knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and
used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.
The intended uses of an article may change after it has been
introduced into interstate commerce by its manufacturer. If, for
example, a packer, distributor, or seller intends an article for
different uses than those intended by the person from whom he
received the drug [device], such packer, distributor, or seller is
required to supply adequate labeling in accordance with the new
intended uses. But if a manufacturer knows, or has knowledge of
facts that would give him notice, that a drug [device] introduced
into interstate commerce by him is to be used for conditions,
purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he is
required to provide adequate labeling for such a drug [device]
which accords with such other uses to which the article is to be
put.
21 C.F.R. 201.128 (drugs); 21 C.F.R. 801.4 (devices). This definition articulates an extremely broad view of the types of evidence the agency can rely
upon to establish a product's intended use. However, FDA has rarely
attempted to classify a product as a drug or device in the absence of
relevant representations by the manufacturer or distributor. The following,
seminal case concerns one of the rare instances in which the agency
attempted to do so.
The case involves high-dose vitamin supplements. FDA traditionally
classified vitamin and mineral products as foods unless therapeutic claims
were made for them. In the early 1970s, however, the agency was confronted with reports of people experiencing toxic effects from large doses of
vitamins A and D. Adelle Davis, a self-proclaimed nutritional expert who
advocated a "natural" approach to good health, recommended megadoses of
these vitamins in her books. Vitamins A and D are fat-soluble nutrients
(which accumulate in fatty tissue), and FDA thus concluded that ingestion
of excess quantities of these vitamins could lead to serious harm.
To meet this problem, FDA promulgated regulations, 37 Fed. Reg.
26618 (Dec. 14, 1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 20723 (Aug. 2, 1973), classifying
preparations providing more than 10,000 international units (IU) of vitamin A or 400 IU of vitamin D per daily serving as drugs and requiring
further that they be sold or:rly on prescription. Vitamin manufacturers
challenged these regulations in court. The District Court initially upheld
the regulations, National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 376 F.
Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), but the Court of Appeals concluded that the
administrative record was incomplete. It remanded the case with instructions that the district court inquire into the FDA Commissioner's reasoning. 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975). After conducting the mandated hearing,
the District Court once again upheld the regulations, 418 F. Supp. 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), and the plaintiffs appealed for a second time.

National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews
557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977).

P. ANDERSON, CrncurT JunGE,
When this case was previously remanded by us to the district
court, we said, "
a serious question is raised as to whether the
•

RoBERT

D

DRUGS A.1\JD DEVICES

( 'ommissioner, in concluding that the higher level dosage forms of Vitamins
\ and D are 'drugs,' acted 'in accordance with law.' " ... In the statement
"n nouncing the proposal of the Vitamins A and D regulations and in the
'nie accompanying their adoption, the Commissioner did not rely upon the
n•cognition of these preparations in the [official compendia] as the basis of
I he drug classification. Rather, the Commissioner determined that the
circumstances surrounding the use of Vitamins A and D at the regulated
levels indicated an intended therapeutic use under § 20l(g)(l)(B). The
vendors' intent in selling the product to the public is the key element in
lhis statutory definition.
In determining whether an article is a "drug" because of an intended
therapeutic use, the FDA is not bound by the manufacturer's subjective
claims of intent but can find actual therapeutic intent on the basis of
objective evidence. Such intent also may be derived or inferred from
labeling, promotional material, advertising, and "any other relevant
source." [Case citations omitted.] In remanding this case, this court expressly indicated that evidence that Vitamins A and D at the regulated
levels were used "almost exclusively for therapeutic purposes" when coupled with lack of a recognized nutritional use, would be sufficient to show
that high dosage Vitamins A and D products were intended for use in the
treatment of disease.

In proposing the regulations, the Commissioner emphasized the potential for toxicity and the widespread promotion of the intake of high doses of
Vitamins A and D to cure a variety of ills. To show objective therapeutic
intent, the Commissioner's affidavit submitted on remand relied upon
three factors: (1) widespread promotion to the public in the use of high
potency Vitamins A and D preparations for the treatment of various
ailments; (2) lack of recognized nutritional usefulness; and (3) potential for
toxicity from the ingestion of large doses of these vitamins over extended
periods of time ..
Plaintiffs assert that toxicity is irrelevant to the issue of therapeutic
intent and, although the key element in determining that a drug should be
limited to prescription use under § 503(b) of the Act, it has no bearing
upon whether an article is a drug. The Government argues, on the other
hand, that toxicity is relevant to therapeutic intent and that the Commissioner must make the decision of whether there should be a regulation
which classifies an article as a food or as a drug, for the purposes of the
Act. Although an article may be recognized as a food, this does not preclude
it from being regulated as a drug. The determination that an article is
properly regulated as a drug, however, is not left to the Commissioner's
unbridled discretion to act to protect the public health but must be in
accordance with the statutory definition. Toxicity is not included as an
element in the statutory definition of a drug. It is relevant as a factor
supporting the Commissioner's classification under § 201(g)(l)(B), but only
to the extent that it constitutes objective evidence of therapeutic intent.
Toxicity is cited by the Commissioner as constituting objective evidence of
"something more" than lack of nutritional usefulness .... Such evidence,
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however, only presents a further indication that the excessive intake of
Vitamins A and D may not be nutritionally useful and does not provide the
objective evidence of therapeutic intent necessary to support these regulations.
There is no evidence in the administrative record that the manufacturers and vendors of Vitamins A and D preparations, at the regulated
dosages, represent through labeling, promotional materials, or advertising
that these products are effective in the cure or treatment of disease. They
are sold as "dietary supplements." ...
The main issue on this appeal is whether the evidence of the extensive
use of large doses of Vitamins A and D to treat or prevent diseases and the
promotion of such usage by persons not associated with the manufacturers
or vendors establishes such widespread therapeutic use at the regulated
levels as to overcome the plaintiffs' claim of the lack of an intended use to
cure or prevent disease and thus justifies the Commissioner's determination.
The Commissioner admits that below the stated levels of potency,
Vitamins A and D are foods. The evidence relied upon to show therapeutic
intent, therefore, must be related to the potency level chosen to differentiate between the use of Vitamins A and D as foods and the use of these
vitamins as drugs. The administrative record clearly establishes that the
factors involved in choosing the levels at which Vitamins A and D become
drugs were solely related to the Commissioner's fear of potential toxic
effect and his belief that the ingestion of vitamins at levels above the U.S.
RDA is not nutritionally useful. No further record evidence has been
produced on the remand to show that the 10,000 IU and 400 IU levels were
chosen because at those potencies, consumption of them is almost exclusively for therapeutic purposes. A sampling of the comments submitted to
the FDA after publication of the proposed regulations reveals that people
believe that a wide range of doses of these vitamins are therapeutically
useful. A large group of individuals indicated that they ingested these
vitamins at various dosages solely to supplement their daily diet in the
belief that more Vitamins A and D were needed to maintain optimal health
than the upper limits in the U.S.,.RDA.
In remanding this case, this court suggested that proof in the record
demonstrating that, at the 10,000 IU and 400 IU levels, respectively, these
vitamins were taken "almost exclusively" for therapeutic purposes, would
tend to show that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. There
was no evidence, however, supporting the Commissioner's conclusion that,
when sold at the regulated, i.e. prescription, levels, therapeutic usage of
these vitamins so far outweighed their use as dietary supplements, it
showed an objective intent that these products were used in the mitigation
and cure of diseases. This claim furnished no contradiction to the charge
that the FDA's regulations are arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law ....
The Commissioner also seeks to justify the Vitamins A and D regulations on the basis of § 201(g)(l)(A), which defines as drugs, articles
"recognized" in the United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) or National Formulary (NF) .... To construe § 201(g)(l)(A) so as to grant the Commis-
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sioner the power to regulate as drugs every item mentioned in the USP and
NF solely on the basis of such inclusion would give the FDA virtually
11 nlimited discretion to regulate as drugs a vast range of items. . . . An
administrator's decision under a regulatory statute, such as the Food,
Ilrug, and Cosmetic Act, must be governed by an intelligible statutory
principle. If§ 20l(g)(l)(A) defines as drugs every item included in the USP
and NF, the FDA is not being consistent in its treatment of other items
similarly recognized. The Commissioner, therefore, has not applied the
~ 20l(g)(l)(A) definition to every item in the compendia. Rather he has
singled out for drug classification items included in the USP and NF on the
basis of factors, such as toxicity in this case, that are not relevant to the
statutory criteria in § 20l(g).
The Commissioner admitted in his affidavit that mere inclusion in the
USP and NF is an insufficient basis for drug classification after the
decision in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n u. FDA [504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1974)]. He attempts to distinguish that case on the ground that Vitamins A
and D are recognized at therapeutic dosages in the compendia and are
regulated as drugs in this case only at levels in excess of the recognized
food levels in the USP. Other articles, however, are recognized in the
compendia at therapeutic levels and not regulated as drugs, for example
Vitamin C. The Commissioner must, therefore, show that the conflicting
treatment in the regulations of items similarly classified in the USP and
NF is not arbitrary under the applicable criteria. The FDA regulates
Vitamin C preparations at the USP' s therapeutic level as food. To justify
the regulation of Vitamins A and D as drugs by relying on § 20l(g)(l)(A)
the Commissioner would have to distinguish his treatment of Vitamin C as
food.
In proposing and adopting these regulations for Vitamins A and D, the
Commissioner did not rely upon or cite the recognition of these vitamins in
the USP and NF. He may not at this late hour on appeal rely upon them as
the basis for his drug classification because it is sheer post hoc rationalization ....

NOTES
1. Subsequent Proceedings. Following this decision, FDA revoked the
lenged regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 10551 (Mar. 14, 1978).

chal~

2. Dual Classification. There is no doubt that a product can be classified
simultaneously as both a therapeutic drug under section 201(g)(l)(B) and as a food.
Indeed, a product currently marketed as a food may at the same time undergo
clinical investigation for drug uses (in compliance with the FDA investigational
drug requirements, discussed infra p. 624). See, e.g., "Nutrition Education-1973:
Phosphate Research and Dental Decay," Hearings before the Senate Select Comm.
on Nutrition and Human Needs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 549 (1973).
On various occasions, courts have upheld FDA's reliance on the Act's broad
definition of "drug" to regulate products that were concededly also subject to the
food provisions of the Act. In the following cases, courts held that products
ordinarily regarded as foods were properly classified as drugs because of the claims
made for them: United States v. 250 Jars
"Cal's Tupelo Blossom U.S. Fancy
Pure Honey", 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. 24 Bottles
"Sterling
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Vinegar and Honey", 338 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Hohensee, 243
F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957) (tea); United States v. 500 Plastic Bottles
"Wilfley's Bio
Water," Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,143 (D. Or. 1989) (water); United
States v. Kollman, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,342 CD. Or. 1985 & 1986)
(blue-green algae harvested from Klamath Lake, Oregon). In each instance, the
agency invoked the drug definition in order to demand premarket testing and
approval, As discussed infra p. 49, a product can also be simultaneously both a drug
and a cosmetic.
3. Once a Drug? In United States v. Articles of Drug . Neptone, Food Drug
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 38,240 (N.D. Cal. 1983), FDA contended that the seized
product was a drug and was granted summary judgment based on the following
reasoning:
Claimant Aquaculture Corporation markets in the United States a
product called Neptone, which is freeze-dried, homogenized, powdered New
Zealand green mussel (Perna canaliculus) in capsule form. In 1976, claimant received from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") an Investigational Exemption for New Drug ("IND") for Neptone. The purpose of
this exemption is to permit claimant to conduct clinical investigations into
Neptone's safety and effectiveness.
Neptone is sold in health food stores and by mail order. Claimant
advertises in various health food magazines. Since 1980, claimant has also
promoted Neptone through several brochures, magazine reprints, and a
scientific paper. These were available on request and were sent to mail
order customers. FDA Consumer Safety Officer Paul J. Sage was one such
customer. In general, claimant's advertising extols the green mussel (and
Neptone) as being high in mucopolysaccharides, which are claimed to help
prevent diseases commonly associated with aging, such as arthritis and
hardening of the arteries.
The Court finds that the claimant's promotional claims clearly
show that it intended Neptone to be used "in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man." The so-called "brown
brochure" is the most flagrant example, but even the so-called "blue
brochure" claims, among other things, that Neptone helps to repel infection, prevent blood clots, and maintain the elasticity of the arteries.
The Court does not view this opinion as establishing for all time that
Neptone is a drug. The determination that Neptone is a drug rests entirely
on the pattern of promotion uSed by claimant in the several years immediately preceding the instant seizure. Should Neptone again be marketed
after some hiatus and a change in labelling, this order will not necessarily
work an estoppel on whether that batch of Neptone is a drug. 1 The answer
will turn on the relationship between the future sales and the offensive
labelling. Clearly, this opinion cannot work any estoppel on the issues of
misbranding and safety and effectiveness .
The Court recognizes that not applying collateral estoppel to future
batches of Neptone might allow it to be marketed without its having been
established as safe and effective. Fault for this lies with the drafters of this
statute for conditioning the safety and effectiveness requirements on
I. This reasoning does not apply to any
Neptone now in existence that is not currently under the in rem jurisdiction of this Court.
The Court has found that claimant's pro·
motions over the past few years reveal Nep-

tone's intended use as a drug. These promotional claims presumably apply to the
N eptone that was effectively seized as well as
to the Neptone that was lnot] effectively
seized.
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labelling. As noted above, claimant brought the regulatory scheme down
upon itself through its labelling and promotional brochures; this Court will
not take the further step of saying that now claimant can never get out
from under the regulatory scheme .
.'-'1·1' also In the Matter of Property Seized from International Nutrition, Food Drug
( :usm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 37, 177 (D. Nev. 1997).
4. Commentary. For discussion on food and drug classifications, see Roseann
1{. 'l'ermini, Product Classification Under the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act:
When a Food Becomes a Drug, 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 1 (1993). For a discussion of
the regulatory boundaries between foods and drugs throughout the world, see Peter
Mansell, Battling Over the Boundaries, SCRIP MAGAZINE, Oct. 2000, at 71.

COMMENT: "INTENDED USE" IN THE ABSENCE OF CLAIMS
Since the decision in Mathews, FDA has rarely asserted its drug or
device jurisdiction over a product unless the manufacturer or distributor
has made representations about product's disease or structure/function
effects. But neither has the agency unequivocally disclaimed its authority
to establish intended use based on the "circumstances surrounding the
distribution of the article." 21 C.F.R. 201.128, 21 C.F.R. 801.4.
The most famous instance in which FDA attempted to declare a
product to be a drug (or device) in the absence of relevant manufacturer
claims was its 1996 rulemaking on cigarettes and smokeless tobacco. 61
Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). FDA argued that tobacco products were
"intended" to affect the structure/function of the body based solely on
evidence concerning the foreseeable and actual use of the products for
stimulation, tranquilization, weight control, and satisfaction of nicotine
addiction and on internal company statements confirming the manufacturers' awareness of these uses. The Supreme Court ultimately denied FDA
jurisdiction without reaching the "intended use" issue. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000), excerpted infra p. 82.
Throughout the Brown & Williamson litigation, the tobacco industry
asserted that no court had ever found that a product was "intended for
use" or "intended to affect" absent manufacturer claims regarding that
product's use. This assertion would no longer be true if made today. In
2001, the United States brought criminal charges against a number of
individuals for selling unlabeled balloons containing nitrous oxide ("laughing gas") in a parking lot outside a rock concert. The government alleged
the defendants were unlawfully distributing misbranded prescription drugs,
in violation of the FD&C Act. In U.S. v. Travia, 180 F. Supp.2d 115, 119
(D.D.C. 2001), the District Court rejected the defendants' argument that
the nitrous oxide they sold was not a "drug" under the FD&C Act because
they made no representations about its use. Judge Thomas Hogan stressed
that intent could be determined not only by labeling, promotional claims,
and advertising, but also by "any other relevant source." He observed,
"This case is obviously unique in that ... the sellers did not need to label
or advertise their product, as the environment provided the necessary
information between buyer and seller. In this context ... the fact that
there was no labeling may actually bolster the evidence of an intent to sell
a mind-altering article without a prescription-that is, a misbranded drug."
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COMMENT: DISEASE CLAIMS FOR FOOD AND
STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FOR DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS
The definition of "drug" in section 20l(g)(l) of the FD&C Act concludes with the following proviso:
A food or dietary supplement for which a claim, subject to sections
403(r)(l)(B) and 403(r)(3) of this title or sections 403(r)(l)(B) and
403(r)(5)(D) of this title, is made in accordance with the requirements of 403(r) of this title is not a drug solely because the label or
the labeling contains such a claim. A food, dietary ingredient, or
dietary supplement for which a truthful and not misleading statement is made in accordance with section 403(r)(6) of this title is
not a drug under clause (C) solely because the label or the labeling
contains such a statement.
This language reflects dramatic changes in the relationship between
food and drugs made by two important statutes passed in the 1990s: the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) and the Dietary
Supplement and Health Act of 1994 CDSHEA). The first sentence refers to
the fact that under the NLEA, a food may, with approval by FDA (or in
accordance with an authoritative statement by a federal scientific body or
the National Academy of Sciences), make a claim "which expressly or by
implication . . . characterizes the relationship of any nutrient
to a
disease or a health-related condition." FD&C Act 403(r)(l)(B). The second
sentence refers to the fact DSHEA establishes a new subcategory of food
called "dietary supplements" and allows such products (many of which are
not "common sense" foods) to make structure and function claims.
FDA began to permit explicit disease claims (termed "health claims"
by the agency) on food labels in the 1980s, following the lead of the Federal
Trade Commission, which started to allow such claims in food advertisements in the 1970s. See infra p. 272. By establishing the NLEA health
claims regime in 1990, Congress was thus authorizing a lenient regulatory
approach that FDA had, in broad terms, already embraced. By contrast,
before the passage of DSHEA, FDA demonstrated a willingness to regulate
dietary supplements aggressive!¥, particularly through the imposition of
the FD&C Act's premarket approval requirements for drugs and food
additives. In short, DSHEA represented an effort by Congress to rein in the
agency. The regulatory regimes for disease claims and dietary supplements
are discussed at length, infra p. 284 and p. 246. At this early stage,
however, it is important to recognize that the desire to subject certain
classes of products to more or less regulation not only shapes FDA' s
interpretation of the statutory definitions, but sometimes leads Congress to
revise the definitions.

3.

"INTENDED UsE" AND THE CosMETIC-DRuG SPECTRUM

An article may fall under the FD&C Act's definitions of "drug" or
"medical device" even if it has no therapeutic purpose, so long as it is
"intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." FD&C Act
20l(g)(l)(C) and 20l(h). The definitions thus raise the question of how
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much, and in what way, a nontherapeutic product must be intended to alter
Lhe body to be considered a drug or device.
Just as an article may be both a "food" and a "drug," a product may
simultaneously fall within the definitions of "cosmetic" and "drug" and be
subject to the requirements of both categories. Cosmetics are the least
intensively regulated of any of the products under FDA' s jurisdiction. The
agency thus has sometimes reached for greater authority over particular
cosmetic products by trying to categorize them as new drugs subject to
premarket review for safety and effectiveness.

Peter Barton Hutt, Reconciling the Legal, Medical, and
Cosmetic Chemist Approach to the Definition of a
"Cosmetic"
3 CTFA CoSMETrcs JoURl\iAL, No. 3 (1971l.

The first principle is that the intended use of the product, rather than
its inherent properties, control[s] its classification. .
[T)he controlling
representations made by the manufacturer may appear in labeling, in
advertising, or in any other form of oral or written communication. And an
implicit representation is as controlling as an explicit one ..
The second general principle is that the representations made for a
product may properly classify it in more than one product category under
the Act. If a product were represented both to treat a disease and to
promote attractiveness, it would properly be classified as both a drug and
cosmetic, and must meet the legal requirements for both categories ....
The third, and final, general principle is that it is the initial and
primary responsibility of the manufacturer or distributor of a product to
determine the proper classification of his product, and to make certain that
it meets all applicable legal requirements ....
Attempting to formulate a hard and fast rule differentiating between
cosmetic claims and drug claims is virtually impossible. Some cosmetics are
intended merely to color some part of the body, in order to promote
attractiveness, and present no problem of proper classification. And on the
other end of the scale, some products are represented to effect a physiological change in the body, and these would clearly fall into the drug category
as well as the cosmetic category. But in between these two extremes is the
difficult area of judgment-the cosmetics that claim to promote attractiveness through a slight, and usually temporary, physical but not physiological, effect upon the skin.
The Food and Drug Administration attempted to deal with the proper
legal classification of some of these various types of products in the
advisory opinions contained in its Trade Correspondence during 1938--1946.
The difficulty in resolving these matters on a purely rational basis is
readily demonstrated by just three of those opinions. FDA stated that
mercury preparations used to bleach or remove tan are drugs because they
are intended to affect the structure and function of the body. On the other
hand, an article represented solely to produce an even tan is regarded by
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FDA as a cosmetic. And a product intended not just to produce an even tan,
but also to prevent sunburn, is a drug ....
A further indication of the distinction between a product that does and
does not affect a bodily structure or function may be found in the area of
deodorants. A product that absorbs perspiration, or masks its odor, or
prevents odor by germicidal or bacteriostatic agents that act upon odorproducing bacteria, is classified by the Food and Drug Administration as a
cosmetic and not a drug. A product that is designed to reduce perspiration
odor by reducing the perspiration itself, through a change in the sweat
glands, is considered by the Food and Drug Administration to be a drug.
A cosmetic may properly be represented for use to mask or cover up
the physical manifestations of a disease, without becoming a drug. Acne
and dandruff are regarded as disease conditions, and any product represented to treat those conditions is classified as a drug. But products that
claim merely to cover up manifestations of acne, or to wash away loose
dandruff flakes, would properly be classified solely as cosmetics.
An analogous question is presented by "hypoallergenic" cosmetic products, which claim to have "screened out" most irritants. Since hypoallergenic foods have not been regarded as drugs it would appear that hypoallergenic cosmetics would similarly not be regarded as drugs absent specific
claims that certain diseases will be treated or relieved by the product ....
A question frequently asked is whether any inclusion of an active
ingredient in a cosmetic automatically classifies it as a drug. The answer is
that classification depends upon the claims made, not upon the inclusion of
the ingredient itself ... _

United States v. An Article ... Sudden Change
409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969) .
• ANDERSON. CIRCUIT JUDGK

This is an appeal in a seizur,. action from an order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ... granting summary
judgment for the claimant. The seizure concerned 216 bottles of a cosmetic
product called "Sudden Change" which is a clear liquid lotion consisting
primarily of two ingredients: bovine albumen (15%) and distilled water
(over 84%). It is meant to be applied externally to the surface of the facial
skin, and it is claimed, inter alia, in its labeling and advertising that it will
provide a "Face Lift Without Surgery." The court below described the
effects of the product as follows:
Allowed to dry on the skin, it leaves a film which (1) masks
imperfections, making the skin look smoother and (2) acts mechanically to smooth and firm the skin by tightening the surface.
Both effects are temporary. There is apparently no absorption by,
or changes in, skin tissue resulting from its applications; it washes
off.
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The central issue presented in this appeal is whether Sudden Change
1s, within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l), a "drug.".

It is well settled that the intended use of a product may be determined
l'rom its label, accompanying labeling, promotional material, advertising
and any other relevant source. Regardless of the actual physical effect of a
product, it will be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act where the labeling
and promotional claims show intended uses that bring it within the drug
definition.
The mere statement of this rule poses a crucial issue: by what standards are these claims to be evaluated? Or, to put it another way, what
degree of sophistication or vulnerability is to be ascribed to the hypothetical
potential consumer in order to understand how these claims are understood
by the buying public?.
[W]e conclude that the purposes of the Act will
best be effected by postulating a consuming public which includes "the
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.
"
While it is not altogether clear what standard the court below applied,
the reasoning appears to assume sometl1ir1g like a "reasonable woman"
standard. Thus, the District Court assumes that the "constant exposure to
puffing and extravagant claims" has induced "some immunity in the
beautifiers' hyperbole" which is such that the court "cannot believe" that
the potential consumer of Sudden Change "expects anything other than a
possibility that she may look better." We agree that certain claims which
arguably would bring the product within § 32l(g)(l)(C) have so drenched
the potential consumer that even the "ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous" must be presumed able to discount their promises as typical of
cosmetic advertising puffery. We cannot agree, however, with the conclusion that such immunity or skepticism somehow transfers to the promise to
"lift out puffs" or give a "face lift without surgery." The references to
"face lift" and "surgery" carry distinctly physiological connotations, suggesting, at least to the vulnerable consumer that the product will "affect
the structure
of the body .. " in some way other than merely
temporarily altering the appearance. We do not accept the concept that
skepticism toward familiar claims necessarily entails skepticism toward
unfamiliar claims; the theory of the legislation is that someone might take
the claim literally.
In other words, witb the exception of those claims which have become
so associated with the familiar exaggerations of cosmetics advertising that
virtually everyone can be presumed to be capable of discounting them as
puffery, 10 the question of whether a product is "intended to affect the
structure
of the body of man ... " is to be answered by considering,
10.
We agree that the legislative
history and the language of the Act require
rejection of any rule which would convert all
cosmetics into drugs. We believe, however,
that the test which we have applied draws
the necessary line while at the same time
protecting the public. For example, promises
that a product will "soften" or "moisturize"

a woman's skin are so thoroughly familiar
that constant exposure can be presumed to
have induced sufficient immunity even in our
hypothetical vulnerable consumer (this assumes, arguendo, that these promises have
exactly the same degree of drug-type connotations as the "face lift v.ithout surgery"
claim-an assumption \Vhich we reject).
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first, how the claim might be understood by the "ignorant, unthinking or
credulous" consumer, and second, whether the claim as so understood may
fairly be said to constitute a representation that the product will affect the
structure of the body in some medical-or drug-type fashion, i.e., in some
way other than merely "altering the appearance."
We hold, therefore, that so long as Sudden Change is claimed to give a
"face lift without surgery" and to "lift out puffs" it is to be deemed a drug
within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(C). It should be understood,
however, that if the claimant ceases to employ these promotional claims
and avoids any others which may fairly be interpreted as claiming to affect
the structure of the skin in some physiological, though temporary, way,
then, assuming arguendo that no actual physical effect exists, the product
will not be deemed a drug for purposes of the Act. While there may be
merit in the cause of those who seek to require pretesting of new cosmetics,
it is not for the courts to legislate such a requirement; rather it must rest
in the hands of Congress to decide whether such an amendment to the
statute should be enacted or not ....
•MANSFIELD, DISTRICT JUDGE (dissenting): ....
In view of the existence of ample authority for regulation of cosmetics,
it strikes me as unnecessary, in the absence of some imminent danger to
public health-and none is suggested here--for the Court to adopt new
standards of construction for the purpose of determining whether an article
is intended as a "drug" rather than to follow time-proven rules. Yet that is
exactly what the Court does here, with the result that it opens up a newand in my view, unnecessary-avenue for regulation of cosmetics as drugs.
If Congress believes that protection of the public requires pretesting and
clearance of cosmetics by the Food and Drug Administration . . . and that
their components be listed on the label, it has the power to act. I do not
think the Court should do so by a process of tortuous construction ....
It may well be that the existence of fraud upon consumers of such
products (whether drugs or cosmetics) should depend upon whether "the
ignorant, the unthinking and credulous" would be deceived. The issue
before us, however, is not whether consumers may be defrauded by the
labelling and enclosures userj in connection with the sale of "Sudden
Change." The issue is whether the product must be classified as a "drug"
which must be pre-tested, cleared and bear a label listing its components.
Since that issue turns upon whether the article is "intended to affect the
structure of the body" (emphasis added), it seems to me that the "gullible"
woman standard is both irrelevant and unnecessary, and that the standard
should be whether a reasonable person would construe the labeling and
advertising as showing that the product was so intended ....

NOTES
1. Parallel Cases. In United States v. An Article
"Line Away," 415 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the promotional material for a similar
product attributed drug characteristics to it:
. . . [T]he repeated statements that Line Away is made in a "pharmaceutical laboratory" and packaged under Hbiologically aseptic conditions"
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i1nply that the product itself is a pharmaceutical. Characterizing the lotion
as "super-active" and "amazing," creating a "tingling sensation" when "at
work," "tightening" the skin and "discouraging new wrinkles from forming" strongly reinforces the impression that this is a therapeutic product,
lhe protein content of which has a tonic or otherwise wholesome physiological effect on the skin itself.
Even the denial that Line Away is a "hormone" or a "harmful
drug," read in the context of the other representations, suggests that it is a
harmless drug.
Some "puffery" may not amount to representation of a cosmetic as a
drug, but when "puffery" contains the strong therapeutic implications we
find in the Line Away promotional material, we think the dividing line has
been crossed.
But United States v. An Article
"Helene Curtis Magic Secret
", 331 F.
Supp. 912 m. Md. 1971), held that Helene Curtis's very similar wrinkle smoother
was a cosmetic and not a drug:
... 'fhe only two claims made for "Magic Secret" which even approach
the magnitude of the claims made in Line Away and Sudden Change are
that "Magic Secret" is a "pure protein" which causes an "astringent
sensation." The promotional material does not emphasize these two claims
and even the "ignorant, unthinking and credulous" consumer would not be
led by these references to believe that "Magic Secret" would do other than
alter their appearance. It is apparent that the promotional claims made for
"Magic Secret" are less exaggerated than those reported in Line Away and
Sudden Change. It cannot be said that they carry the same drug connotations as found by the Second and Third Circuits.
'fhe court concluded that the product's promotional material would lead a prospeclive purchaser only to expect that she may look better, and not that the structure of
the body would be affected. See also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1105
19th Cir. 1994) (endorsing Magic Secret analysis, but concluding that a baldness
remedy claiming new hair growth was a drug).
2. Subsequent FDA Actions Regarding Antiwrinkle Products. Beginning in
April 1987, FDA sent regulatory letters to dozens of cosmetic manufacturers
alleging that products with "wrinkle remover" claims were illegal new drugs.
" 'Antiaging' Creams Challenged," FDA Talk Paper No. T87-24 (May 14, 1987). A
series of meetings and correspondence between an industry coalition and FDA on
this matter was abruptly terminated on November 19, 1987 by the following
statement in a letter by the FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs.
We consider a claim that a product will affect the body in some physiologi~
cal way to be a drug claim, even if the claim is that the effect is only
temporary. Such a clain1 constitutes a representation that the product is
intended to affect the structure or function of the body and thus makes the
product a drug under 21 U.S.C. 32l(g)(l)(C). Therefore, we consider most
of the anti-aging and skin physiology claims that you outline in your letter
to be drug claims. For example, claims that a product 'counteracts/
'retards,' or 'controls' aging or the aging process, as well as claims that a
product will 'rejuvenate,' 'repair,' or 'renew' the skin, are drug claims
because they can be fairly understood as claims that a function of the body,
or that the structure of the body, will be affected by the product. For this
reason also, all of the examples that you use to allege an effect within the
epidermis as the basis for a temporary beneficial effect on wrinkles, lines,
or fine lines are unacceptable. A claim such as 'molecules absorb
and
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expand,' exerting upward pressure to 'lift' wrinkles (upward' is a claim for
an inner, structural change.
The Associate Commissioner did offer some guidelines for cosmetic claims:

While we agree with your statements that wrinkles will not be re~
versed or removed by these products ... we would not object to claims that
products will temporarily improve the appearance of such outward signs of
aging. The label of such products should state that the product is intended
to cover up the signs of aging, to improve the appearance by adding color or
a luster to skin, or otherwise to affect the appearance through physical
means.

. . . [W]e would consider a product that claims to improve or to
maintain temporarily the appearance or the feel of the skin to be a
cosmetic. For example, a product that claims to moisturize or soften the
skin is a cosmetic.
An attempt by one manufacturer to obtain clarification of the dividing line
between cosmetic and drug claims for these products through a declaratory judgment action was thwarted when the court agreed with FDA's contention that the
matter was not ripe for judicial review. Estee Lauder, Inc. v. FDA, 727 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1989). Individual companies eventually resolved their issues with FDA, and
the agency ultimately did not bring formal action against any of these products.

After a lull, FDA has recently resumed taking action against antiwrinkle
products. It issued warning letters to two manufacturers of skin creams, stating
that the companies were selling unapproved drugs. See Warning Letters Address
Claims Made for Topical Skincare Preparations, Office of Cosmetics and Colors
Press Release (Mar. 1, 2005). The objectionable claims cited by FDA with respect to
one of these products, Collagen5, included: "Collagen5"' is proven to reduce deep
wrinkles up to
70%," "Stimulates your skin's own collagen building network,"
"Reduces deep wrinkles from within the skin's surface," and "Visible results that
won't fade away." Warning Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, Director, Los Angeles
District, FDA, to University Medical Products USA, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2004). The other
warning letter cited (among many other statements) the manufacturers' reference
to "Pal-KTTKS solution's effectiveness at reducing the appearance of fine lines and
wrinkles.'' Warning Letter from B. Belinda Collins, Director, Denver District Office,
FDA, to Basic Research, LLC (Jan. 14, 2005). It is unclear why FDA took issue with
this particular claim; perhaps it objected to the manufacturer's failure to declare
that the effects were only "tempor~."
3. Thigh Creams. The warning letters discussed above in Note 2 also informed
companies that products claiming to combat cellulite, stretch marks, and breast sag
and shrinkage and to reduce thigh circumference and overall weight were unapproved drugs. Warning Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, Director, Los Angeles District,
FDA, to University Medical Products USA, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2004); Warning Letter
from B. Belinda Collins, Director, Denver District, FDA, to Basic Research, LLC.
FDA has suggested that it views all thigh creams promoted for cellulite reduction as
drugs. See Thigh Creams, Office of Cosmetics and Colors Fact Sheet (Feb. 24, 2000)
("Thigh creams may more appropriately be classified as drugs under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act since removal or reduction of cellulite affects the 'structure
or function' of the body.")
4. Hair Care Products: In United States v. Kasz Enterprises, Inc., 855 F. Supp.
534 (D.R.!. 1994), the U.S. District Court found that the distributor's two hair care
products were drugs. Although the defendant stated that it never labeled or
promoted its products as cures for baldness or to prevent hair loss, the court found
the company was aware that its products were being offered by others to prevent
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li<tldness. "The promotional materials accompanying Solutions 109 are replete with
daims (testimonials) that hair growth has occurred and hair loss prevented with
11:-;e of these products. Therefore, Solutions 109 are intended by Kasz for use in the
1nitigation, treatment, or prevention of hair loss and are thus drugs. . . "
In a series of warning letters that FDA began issuing in April 2003, it reminded
1nanufacturers that hair care products marketed with claims such as restoration of
hair growth, hair loss pr~vention, and treatment of dandruff are considered drugs,
not cosmetics. Office of Cosmetics and Colors, Warning Letters Address Hair Care
Products, Apr. 3, 2003.

5. FDA's Persistence. FDA continues to challenge, as unapproved drugs,
numerous products portrayed if not expressly labeled as providing health benefits.
E.g., United States v. Eighteen Units, More or Less, of ".')ports Oxygen," Food Drug
Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 39,025, 5 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ten
Cartons, More or Less, of an Article
Ener-B, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 39,518, 72 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995) (nasal gel containing vitamin B12); Letter from
Ronald G. Chesemore, FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, to
Walter E. Byerley (Dec. 26, 1990)(facial tissue impregnated with antibiotic).

COMMENT: "COSMECEUTICALS"
FDA scientists recognized very early that all cosmetics penetrate the
skin and thus affect the body. As one wrote: "[T]here are few if any
substances which are not ahsorbed through the intact skin, even though
the idea is prevalent that the skin is a relatively effective barrier to its
environment." H.O. Calvery, Safeguarding Foods and Drugs in Wartime,
32 AM. SCIENTIST No. 2, at 103, 119 (1944). There are some skin care
products marketed as cosmetics, however, that clearly have more significant effects on the body than do traditional cosmetics. These products are
often referred to as "cosmeceuticals." Although the FDA does not itself use
the term "cosmeceutical," it recognizes that cosmetic manufacturers use
this word "to refer to cosmetic products that have medicinal or drug-like
benefits." Office of Cosmetics & Color Fact Sheet, (rev. Feb. 24, 2000).
When defining "cosmeceutical," the FDA remarked, "If a product has
drug properties, it must be approved as a drug." Id. This statement is one
of several instances in which the agency has suggested that the presence of
an ingredient with pharmacological effects may render a product a drug,
regardless of the claims made by the manufacturer. In 1996, John Bailey,
the Director of FDA's Office of Cosmetics and Colors, stated, "If an active
ingredient is present in a therapeutic concentration, the product is a drug,
even if that product does not claim to produce the effect that will result
from the action of the therapeutically effective ingredient." Anita H. Shaw,
The News in Skin Care, SOAP-CosM.-CHEM. SPECIALTIES. Oct. 1, 1996, at 72.
The validity of Bailey's statement hinges on whether the agency must,
in determining "intent," always depend at least in part on claims by the
manufacturer. As will be discussed infra p. 81, when FDA asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products as medical devices in the 1990s, it vigorously
maintained that evidence from "other relevant sources" could, on its own,
establish objective intent. In the world of "cosmeceuticals," this question
has been raised most frequently with regard to two types of topically
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applied products: cosmetics containing hormones and cosmetics containing
alpha hydroxy acids.
In 1993, FDA proposed a rule declaring that any cosmetic product
containing more than a specified amount of the hormones pregnenolone
acetate or progesterone was an unapproved drug, regardless of manufacturer claims. The agency observed that, above these amounts, the ingredients
affected the structure or function of the body. 58 Fed Reg. 47611 (Sept. 9,
1993). The agency also proposed banning "natural estrogens" from cosmetics altogether, unless manufacturers provided adequate data on the safety
and exact chemical identity of such estrogens. "[T]he agency concludes at
this time that any use of natural estrogens in cosmetic products makes the
product an unapproved new drug. The conclusion is based on available data
stating conclusively that at some levels the ingredients affect the structure
or function of the body, and a concomitant lack of data establishing at what
level, if any, the drug effect ceases." Finally, FDA also proposed that the
use of the word "hormone" in the labeling or ingredient statement of any
cosmetic product was an implied drug claim. In 2004, the agency withdrew
this proposed rule but remarked that "this withdrawal neither affirms nor
rejects statements contained in the preamble [to the proposed rule]." 69
Fed. Reg. 68833 (Nov. 26, 2004). Although the rule was never finalized,
FDA did finalize a drug regulation, proposed simultaneously, providing that
the use of the word "hormone" in the labeling or ingredient statement of
any topically applied product is an implied drug claim. 58 Fed. Reg. 4 7610
(Sept. 9, 1993), codified at 21 C.F.R. 310.530(a).
Alpha hydroxy acids (AHAs) are chemicals that cause the skin to lose
its outer layer. Manufacturers of cosmetics containing AHAs claim their
products will smooth fine lines, reduce spots, and improve skin condition in
general. In a 1994 speech, FDA official John Bailey stated: "In the final
analysis, it is well established that AHAs exert an effect on the skin. I don't
think that there is any doubt that, under some conditions of formulation
and use, AHA containing products are affecting the structure and function
of the body and that they should be regulated as drugs." Quoted in
Jacqueline A. Greff, Regulation of Cosmetics that are also Drugs, 51 Foon
DRUG CosM. L.J. 243, 257 (1997). Nonetheless, FDA has not, to this point,
charged a manufacturer with- selling an unapproved drug based solely on
the fact that the product contains AHAs. It has addressed safety issues
raised by AHA-containing skin care products based solely on its authority
over cosmetics. See 70 Fed. Reg. 1721 (Jan. 10, 2005) (announcing availability of final guidance advising manufacturers of AHA-containing cosmetics
to label them so as to alert consumers of the need to limit sun exposure and
apply sunscreen). For further discussion on AHAs, see Laura A. Heymann,
The Cosmetic/Drug Dilemma: FDA Regulation of Alpha-Hydroxy Acids, 52
Foon & DRUG L.J. 357 (1997).

NOTES
1. Approved Cosmetic Drugs and Devices. In recent years, FDA has approved
new drug applications (NDAs) and device premarket approval applications (PMAs)
for antiwrinkle products. Renova (tretinoin) is a prescription drug approved to
reduce fine wrinkles) discoloration, and roughness on facial skin. BOTOX Cosmetic

D

DRUGS AND DEVICES

1!~1itulinum Toxin Type A) is a prescription drug approved to treat frown lines
ln·lween the eyebrows. The agency has approved collagen and hyaluronic acid gel,
I1olh injectable antiwrinkle products, as medical devices, as well as lasers making
:u1tiwrinkle claims.
The agency has approved NDAs for two types of hair regrowth products:
H,ogaine (minoxidil), a topical solution, and Propecia (finasteride), a drug in pill
l'orm.

2. OTC Drug Review. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Over-the-Counter
(OTC) Drug Review is the primary process by which the agency has assessed the
o;afety and effectiveness of active ingredients in OTC drug products. In this context,
the relationship between the Act's definitions of "cosmetic" and "drug)' has
Crequently been at issue. The agency has frequently evaded the question of whether
a particular use of a substance is solely a cosmetic use or also a drug use by simply
restricting the use of the substance in both cosmetics and drugs. E.g., 21 C.F.R
250.250(d) & (cJ (limiting the use of hexacholorophene in OTC drugs and cosmetics). Cf 21 C.F.R. 310.545(a)(l 7) (skin-bleaching OTC drug products containing
ammoniated mercury are not generally recognized as safe and effective) & 700.13
(mercury-containing skin-bleaching agents are drugs as well as cosmetics and are
misbranded and adulterated). For discussions of the various OTC drug monographs
in which the cosmetic/drug distinction has been considered, see William E. Gilbertson, FDA OTC Drugs Standards Versus Cosmetic Standards, 21 DRUG INFO. J.
379 (1987); Stephen H. McNamara, The Food and Drug Administration Over-theCounter Drug Review-Concerns of the Cosmetic Industry, 38 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
289 (1983).

COMMENT: DEODORANT PRODUCTS
FDA's policy for products that deal with body odors seems to have
evolved recently. Describing a product as a deodorant is indisputably a
cosmetic claim, and deodorant products that merely mask odor with perfumes are clearly cosmetics and not drugs. But what of products that attack
odors with antimicrobial ingredients? It was long assumed that a mouthwash or deodorant soap could make a claim like "kills germs that cause
odor" without becoming a drug for regulatory purposes. In the early 1990s,
however, the preambles to the tentative final monographs for various types
of OTC antiseptic drug products firmly stated that claims of this sort would
subject a product to regulation as a drug. 56 Fed. Reg. 33644, 33648-49
(July 22, 1991) (first aid antiseptics); 59 Fed. Reg. 6084, 6088-89 (Feb. 9,
1994) (oral antiseptics); 59 Fed. Reg. 31402, 31440 (health care antiseptics).
Importantly, in these preambles, FDA disclaimed any intention to regulate
deodorant products without such claims as drugs merely because they
contained antimicrobial ingredients. 56 Fed. Reg. at 33648; 59 Fed. Reg. at
6088.
About the same time, FDA initiated a seizure action against a product
called Pets Smellfree. The agency contended that the product, a pet food
additive containing a subtherapeutic dose of an antibiotic, was an adulterated and misbranded animal drug. The manufacturer claimed the product
"stops those awful odors associated with feces, urine, gas and BAD
BREATH." One advertisement added that Pets Smellfree "will neutralize
the undesirable mercaptans in the digestive tract without affecting the
desirable bacterial flora." U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Botti.es of ...
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"Pets Smellfree", 1991 WL 11666517 (D. Utah 1991). (Mercaptans are
sulfur-containing organic compounds.) The District Court accepted the
company's argument that the product was not a drug, but the court of
appeals reversed. U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Bottles of . . . "Pets
Smellfree", 22 F.3d 235 (10th Cir. 1994). Interestingly, the Court of
Appeals did not refer to even one instance in which the manufacturer
mentioned the product's antibacterial properties. Instead, the court seemed
to hold that Pets Smellfree could properly be deemed a drug simply because
of common knowledge that bacterial contamination causes those odors the
product claimed to stop. Id. 239-40. The Pets Smellfree analysis of the drug
status of a deodorant product was thus even more expansive than the
principles FDA enunciated in the human antiseptic drug monographs
discussed above. But see E.R. Squibb & Sons u. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (a claim that a product suppresses the growth a fungus in
the body does not implicate the drug definition's structure-function provision, in part because "it is questionable whether a drug that acts only upon
non-human organisms that happen to reside within the human body can
properly be understood as affecting the 'body of man.' ")
NOTES
1. Other Products on the Cosmetic-Drug Line. There are a variety of common
claims that can turn a product with cleansing or beautifying uses into a drug in
addition to, or instead of, a cosmetic. A recent article included a list of some
important examples of this phenomenon, based on decades of FDA literature and
practice:
A suntan product is a cosmetic but a sunscreen product is a drug.
A deodorant is a cosmetic but an antiperspirant is a drug.
A shampoo is a cosmetic but an antidandruff shampoo is a drug.
A toothpaste is a cosmetic but an anticaries toothpaste is a drug.
A skin exfoliant is a cosmetic but a skin peel is a drug.
A mouthwash is a cosmetic but an antigingivitis mouthwash is a drug.
A hair bulking product is a cosmetic but a hair growth product is a drug.
A skin product to hide acne is"a cosmetic but an antiacne product is a drug.

An antibacterial deodorant soap is a cosmetic but an antibacterial antiinfective soap is a drug.
A skin moisturizer is a cosmetic but a wrinkle remover is a drug.
A lip softener is a cosmetic but a product for chapped lips is a drug.
Peter Barton Hutt, The Legal Distinction in the United States Between a Cosmetic
and a Drug, in COSMECEUTICALS' DRUGS vs. COSMETICS 223, 228 (Peter Elsner &
Howard I. Maibach, eds., 2000).
Recent developments have reinforced many of these traditional positions taken
by the agency. With regard to some of these products, however, FDA has manifested
an inclination to categorize articles containing pharmacologically active ingredients
as drugs even when their manufacturers make only cosmetic claims. As discussed
above, the agency has made some moves in this direction with regard to AHA and
hormone-containing skin care products. Moreover, when issuing its tentative final
monograph for sunscreen drug products, FDA stated unambiguously that "a prod-
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uct containing a sunscreen ingredient, even when labeled solely as a tanning aid, is
both intended and understood to be a sunburn preventative. Such a product,
therefore, is a drug under the act." 58 Fed. Reg. 28194, 28204 (May 12, 1993). At
the same time that it issued its final sunscreen monograph, 64 Fed. Reg. 27666
(May 21, 1999), the agency revoked a 1940 official trade correspondence declaring
that products promoted solely for tanning purposes (as opposed to products intended to be used as sunburn preventatives) are cosmetics and not drugs. 64 Fed. Reg.
27798 (May 21, 19991.

2. lntercenter Agree1nent. To facilitate oversight of products claiming to be

cosmetics but that also folfill the statutory definition of a drug, CDER and CFSAN
entered an agreement affording either center the jurisdiction to bring regulatory
actions relating to such products. See lntercenter Agreement Between the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research and the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition to Assist FDA in I1nple1nenting the Drug and Cosmetic Provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cos1netic Act /Or Products that Purport to be Cosmetics but Meet the
Statuto1y Definition of a Drug (June 2002).

3. Conunentary. For additional discussion of the cosmetic-drug spectrum, see
Arlene Erlebacher, When ls a "Cosmetic" Also a "Drug" Under the Federal Food,
Drug and Custnetic Act, 27 Foon DRUG CosM. L.J. 740 (1972); Jacqueline A. Greff,
Regulation of Cosmetics that are also Drugs, 51 Foon & DRUG L.J. 243 (1996); The
Legal Distinction in the United States Between a Cosmetic and a Drug, Peter Barton
Hutt, in COSMECEUTICAL~: DRUGS vs. COSMETICS 223 (Peter Elsner et al., eds. 2000);
Vincent A. Kleinfeld, "Cos1netic" or "Drug"-The Minotaur's Labyrinth, 22 FOOD
DRUG CosM L.J. 376 (1967); Bryan A. Liang and Kurt M. Hartman, It's Only Skin
Deep: FDA Regulation of Skin Care Cosmetics Claims, 8 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y
249 (1999); Stephen H. McNamara, Performance Claims for Shin Care Cosmetics,
41 Foon DRUG Cosr-.t L.J. 151 (1986); Symposium on the Cosmetic-Drug Distinction,
21 DHUG INFO. J. 377 (1987).

COMMENT: OTHER TYPES OF DRUGS WITH NONTHERAPEUTIC
USES
Lethal Products. In United States u. Beuthanasia D Regular, Food
Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCHJ ~ 38,265 CD. Neb. 1979), the court upheld an
FDA seizure of products intended for euthanasia of animals, rejecting the
company's argument that the products were not drugs and thus were
outside the jurisdiction of the FD&C Act. Two years later, FDA rejected a
petition to assert jurisdiction over the use of approved pharmaceuticals by
state prison officials to execute prisoners sentenced to death. Letter from
FDA Commissioner A.H. Hayes, Jr., to D.E. Kendall, FDA Dkt No. 80P0513 (July 7, 1981). The Supreme Court ultimately held that the agency's
refusal to take enforcement action in this instance was unreviewable.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Drugs of Abuse. Prior to 1970, federal control of narcotic drugs,
marijuana, and other drugs used for recreational and nonmedical purposes
was shared among several agencies and rested on a haphazard cluster of
laws enacted since 1900. For example, FDA was responsible for enforcement of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, 79 Stat. 226, to
prevent abuse of depressant and stimulant drugs that also have legitimate
medical uses, such as amphetamines and barbiturates.
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In 1970, Congress repealed the earlier statutes and enacted a new
comprehensive law, the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242,
codified in 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of
substances with strong potential for abuse, calibrated according to their
degree of danger. Responsibility for enforcement of the distribution controls of the Controlled Substances Act rests with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) of the Department of Justice. DEA has the obligation to consult with FDA on the scheduling of controlled substances.
FDA's recommendations on scientific and medical matters are binding, and
DEA may not schedule a drug if FDA recommends against it. Moreover,
FDA regulates the legitimate medical uses of scheduled substances the
same way it regulates other drugs. Schedule I drugs-that is, illegal drugs
with no approved medical use, such as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana-are
under the exclusive jurisdiction of DEA.
Street Drug Alternatives. The FDA considers products manufactured,
marketed, or distributed as alternatives to illicit street drugs to be unapproved new drugs. FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH. GumANCE FOR INDUSTRY; STREET DRUG ALTERNATIVES (2000). Street drug alternatives
are often labeled as dietary supplements containing botanicals, vitamins,
and minerals. They are marketed with claims implying that they mimic the
effects of controlled substances. In United States u. Undetermined Quantities of Articles of Drug, 145 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D. Md. 2001). The district
court concluded that the defendants' products, comprising a variety of
herbs, were not dietary supplements. Instead, it found them to be unapproved new drugs because the labeling and promotional claims, including a
catalog explicitly stating the products were "for mood enhancement,"
showed that the manufacturers intended these products to affect the
function of the mind.
Oxygen Bars. Establishments known as "oxygen bars" first became
popular in the late 1990s. These businesses offer customers the opportunity
to sniff purified oxygen through a plastic hose inserted into their nostrils.
The oxygen is sometimes "flavored" with aromatic solutions. Oxygen bar
patrons variously believe that this practice reduces stress, increases energy
and alertness, reduces headaches. and hangover symptoms, and generally
relaxes the body. Oxygen has legltimate uses as a medical gas, of course,
and FDA regulates it as a prescription drug. Although oxygen bar proprietors are careful not to make medical claims, FDA has declared that any
type of oxygen administered for breathing is a prescription drug, regardless
of its labeling. Nevertheless, the agency has chosen to exercise its administrative discretion and leave the regulation of oxygen intended for recreational use to the states. See Oxygen Bars: Is a Breath of Fresh Air Worth
It?, FDA CONSUMER MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 9.

4.
a.

THE "DEVICE" DEFINITION
COSMETIC DEVICES

The section above on the cosmetic-drug spectrum discussed the categorization of products intended to cleanse, beautify, or promote attractiveness. Some articles intended for cosmetic use operate through physical,
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rather than chemical, action and thus raise similar issues with respect to
the device definition. As with cosmetic drugs, the question of whether a
cosmetic device is a "device" under the FD&C Act hinges on how much,
and in what way, the article is "intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body." FD&C Act 20l(h)(3).
FDA does not consider most nonmechanical household cosmetic implements to be "devices" under the Act. The following products, for example,
fall outside the device requirements unless they make medical claims:
toothpicks, hair brushes, combs, nail files, nail clippers, nail scissors,
razors, tweezers, and loofah sponges (used to exfoliate the skin). On the
other hand, FDA regulates breast implants and chin prostheses as medical
devices, regardless of whether they are intended to be used for reconstructive or cosmetic purposes. 21 C.F.R. 878.3530, 3540, 3550. In addition, the
agency treats collagen used to correct wrinkles and acne scars as a medical
device, defined as "dermal collagen implants for aesthetic use." See PMA
Approval for CosmoDerm 1 Human-Based Collagen, CosmoDerm 2 Human-Based Collagen, and CosmoPlast Human-Based Collagen (Mar. 11,
2003). FDA also treats tanning lamps, epilators (used for hair removal),
and tongue scrapers (used to treat bad breath) as medical devices. 21 C.F.R.
878.5350 ("needle-type epilator"); 878.5360 ("tweezer-type epilator");
868.4635 ("ultraviolet lamp for tanning"); 872.6855 ("manual toothbrushes/' which is how FDA categorizes tongue scrapers).
Decorative contact lenses are products that do not correct vision but
change the apparent color of the iris, seem to add a design to it, or give the
eye a nonhuman or otherwise abnormal appearance. They present the same
significant risks of eye injury that corrective contact lenses do. Corrective
contact lenses are regulated as prescription medical devices, and it had long
been assumed that noncorrective lenses were devices, as well. In 2002,
however, Daniel Troy, the FDA Chief Counsel, informed the agency's
Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) that he was considering declaring that noncorrective decorative contact lenses are not medical
devices. Megan Garvey, Health Concerns Tinge Use of Cosmetic Lenses, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at 1. 'l'his information motivated California Congressman Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member of the House of
Representatives Committee on Government Reform, to write the following
letter to Tommy Thompson, the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Tommy
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services
AUf,,'USt 26, 2002.

I am writing to alert you to a plan apparently set in motion by the
Chief Counsel of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to reclassify
colored contact lenses that do not correct vision as cosmetics instead of
medical devices, essentially deregulating these products. Under current
law, manufacturers of colored lenses must meet federal standards of
hygiene and sterility and can sell their products only with a prescription.
FDA' s new plan, however, would eliminate these rules, make colored lenses
available over-the-counter without adequate directions for safe use, and
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depend on an underfunded cosmetics enforcement division with limited
safety authority to protect consumers. It would also establish a precedent
that could lead to the deregulation of many more potentially hazardous
prescription drugs and devices.
Because poor-quality or misused contact lenses can cause severe eye
infections, painful corneal disease, and even blindness, the FDA plan
virtually guarantees serious medical complications. . . . Ophthalmologists
and optometrists find no justification to treat colored lenses differently
from corrective contact lenses. I urge you to intervene personally and stop
what is a legally unsound and medically dangerous policy.
Contact lenses all qualify as medical devices under the third part of the
[medical device definition at section 201(h)], as a product that is "intended
to affect the structure or any function of the body of man." Lenses
unavoidably alter the structure of the body by profoundly altering the
biology of the eye. As one leading ophthalmology textbook states:
A contact lens may be considered to be an optical patch and
bandage. As a patch it reduces the availability of oxygen to and the
dissipation of carbon dioxide from the cornea. As a bandage :t
creates pressure on the underlying tissues and reduces wetting of
the ocular surface and dissipation of material from between the
contact lens and the cornea.
These effects are unavoidable and foreseeable. Any manufacturer of contact
lenses that intends for users to place the products in the eye must also
intend for these effects to occur.
This longstanding and fair reading of the law, however, has apparently
been rejected by the Chief Counsel of FDA, Daniel Troy. Mr. Troy appears
to believe that a product is only a "medical device" if it is marketed
expressly as something that will affect the structure or function of the
body. His argument seems to be that since colored noncorrective contact
lenses are not marketed as something to correct a problem (like poor
vision), these products cannot be classified as medical devices.
This reasoning is both wrong and dangerous. It is wrong because of
legislative history, administrative precedent, and legal precedent, including
cases in which courts have acknowledged FDA's ability to regulate products
on the basis of evidence other than express marketing claims. Indeed, two
such cases have expressly found that colored noncorrective contact lenses
are medical devices. It is dangerous because of its logical consequence. If a
medical device or a drug (which is defined using similar terms) must be
expressly marketed as a treatment to fall under the FDCA, then manufacturers can simply use their marketing claims to evade regulation altogether. Breast implants and collagen injections marketed for aesthetic appeal
and condoms marketed for pleasure would not be medical devices. Botox
marketed for cosmetic purposes would not be a drug. A company might
even attempt to market valium as "fun" to evade drug regulation ....

NOTES
L Subsequent Events. In April 2003, FDA officially stated that it considered
noncorrective decorative contact lenses to be cosmetics, but not devices. See Guin-
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STAFF ON SAMPLING OR DETENTION WITHOUT PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF

(Import Alert 86-10); 68 Fed. Reg. 16520, 16521 (Apr.
4, 2003). Subsequently, Rep. Waxman-with support from the major manufacturers
of colored lenses, advocacy organizations dedicated to eye health and safety, and eye
health professionals-cosponsored legislation requiring FDA to regulate decorative
contact lenses as medical devices. In November 2005, Congress amended the FD&C
Act by adding new subsection 520(n), "Regulation of Contact Lens (sic] as Devices."
This new provision provides: "All contact lenses shall be deemed to be devices
under section 20HhJ." 119 Stat. 2119. It also, however, declares: "Paragraph (1)
shall not be construed as bearing on or being relevant to the question of whether
any product other than a contact lens is a device as defined by section 20l(h) or a
drug as defined by section 201(g)."
2. Are Contact Lenses "Cosnietics"? As discussed above, supra p. 39, there are
valid questions as to whether contact lenses fit the definition of "cosmetic."
DECORATIVE CONTACT LENSES

b.

DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES

The device definition includes articles (including "in vitro reagents")
"intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions." FD&C
Act 201(h). This provision raises its own interpretive problems.

United States of America v. 25 Cases, More or Less, of
an Article of Device ... "Sensor Pad for Breast SelfExamination"
942 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1991) .
•

CUDAHY, CIRCUIT JUDGE

In this case we are called on to interpret the word "device" as used in
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 32l(h)(2) (1988) (the
Act). The government brought this action to seize the appellant's inventory, believing it to consist of adulterated devices in interstate commerce. The
district court granted summary judgment for the government ..
In the mid-1980s, Earl Wright developed a product which he believed
would aid women in conducting self-examinations for the early detection of
breast cancer. This product, descriptively named the "Sensor Pad," consists of a flat, circular latex bag filled with a layer of silicone lubricant. It is
intended to be placed over the breast during self-examinations to improve
the woman's ability to feel abnormalities beneath the skin. Wright and his
associates believed the Pad was not a "device" under the Act ..
According to the Act, the term device "means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other
similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory
which is
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease. . " 21 U.S.C. § 32l(h).
Although agreeing that its Pad aids in
the detection and screening of breast cancer, Inventive Products nevertheless argues that the word diagnosis does not encompass the function of the
Sensor Pad. Diagnosis, the appellant suggests, includes only examinations
to "determine the nature and circumstances of a diseased condition."
Because the Sensor Pad merely helps the woman in detecting abnormalities
i
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that could be symptoms of a disease, strictly speaking it is used before
actual diagnosis.
The distinction appellant attempts to draw between screening and
diagnosis is an untenable one. In its opening brief, Inventive Products
appears to argue that diagnosis occurs only at the last step in the process of
discovering a disease, that step which ultimately determines the nature and
circumstances of a diseased condition. Thus, because the Sensor Pad only
detects irregularities which may or may not be cancerous growths, it does
not diagnose the disease. Indeed appellant agrees with one of its expert
physicians, who averred that ''biopsy is the only means of diagnosing breast
cancer." By proposing that medical inquiries change from screening to
diagnosis only at the final determination, the appellant's theory would
apparently exclude even a mammography unit from being classified as
diagnostic, because it too cannot confirm the presence of cancer ....
The obscurity of the line appellant would draw between diagnosis and
screening ... well illustrates the arbitrariness of the line-drawing. Pursuing this fruitless inquiry is irrelevant in any event since we believe
Congress had no such screening/diagnosing distinction in mind when it
wrote section 32l(h).
The current description of "device" in the Act was adopted essentially
in the original version of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938), the development of which is discussed in United States v.
Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 793-98 (1969). The bill
emerged from committee in the Senate with several amendments, one of
which proposed broadening the definition of "device" to include tools used
in diagnosis of disease. At that time one senator, with the voiced approval
of the bill's sponsor, summarized the amendment on the floor of the
chamber: "the word 'diagnosis' merely adds to their uses, namely, their use
in looking into a situation prior to the time when the cure or mitigation
shall begin." 79 Cong. Rec. 4843 (1935) (statement of Sen. Barkley).
Another senator meanwhile offered the view that weight scales used during
the diagnosis of a patient would come within the bill's regulation. Id.
(statement of Sen. Clark).
r
Moreover, even if Congress' intentions with regard to the scope of
"diagnosis" were not clear from its debate, the FDA's position in this
matter would still prevail. It would be entirely plausible to suggest that
Congress intended the FDA to decide for itself which devices are used for
diagnosing disease. One senator opined on the floor of the Senate that "the
language [of the bill] is broad enough to cover any device of which the Food
and Drug Bureau of the Agricultural Department chooses to take jurisdiction." Id. at 4841. Such a delegation to the FDA would require a court to
give considerable deference to the agency's decision ....
Second, even had Congress never considered the question before us, we
might allow the FDA room to decide the question itself. Courts often will
defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision
within the agency's own organic statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ....
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Our approach in this case has been further reinforced by the Supreme
Court, which reminded litigants that "remedial legislation such as the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent
with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public health .... " BactoUnidisk, 394 U.S. at 798. A broad definition of "diagnosis" allows for
greater authority in the agency to oversee developments in health care, and
thus to better protect the public health.
For each of the above reasons, the district court was correct to grant
the government's motion for summary judgment in this case ..

NOTES
1. Diagnostic Drugs. The definition of "drug" at FD&C Act 20l(g)(l) includes
"articles intended for use in the diagnosis
of disease." Unlike the definition of
"device," this provision does not embrace products intended for the diagnosis of
;'conditions" other than diseases. Since 1976, FDA has regulated almost all diagnostic products (whether for diseases or "other conditions") as medical devices. See
infra p. 983.
2. "Diagnosis" for What Purpose? FDA regulates as devices "OTC test sample
collection systems for drugs of abuse testing." These products, according to the
regulation, are intended to "[cjollect biological specimens (such as hair, urine,
sweat, or saliva), outside of a medical setting and not on order of a health care
professional (e.g., in the home, insurance, sports, or workplace setting); maintain
the integrity of such specimens during storage and transport in order that the
matter contained therein can be tested in a laboratory for the presence of drugs of
abuse or their metabolites; and provide access to test results and counseling." 21
C.F.R. 864.3260. VVhen it finalized this regulation, FDA rejected a comment which
asserted that kits for detecting drugs of abuse in hair are not medical devices under
section 201(h) of the FD&C Act because they are not for medical diagnosis and

treatment. 65 Fed. Reg. 18230, 18232 (Apr. 7, 2000).
In U.S. u. Undetermined Numbe1· of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir.
1994), the Tenth Circuit held that containers used to collect urine and saliva
specimens for HP/ testing were devices, even though the laboratory-defendant that
distributed the containers performed the testing for insurance risk-assessment
purposes rather than for medical treatment.
c.

LIMITS OF THE DEVICE DEFINITION

COMMENT: COMMON SENSE LIMITATIONS ON THE
DEFINITION OF "DEVICE"?
FDA's 1996 tobacco rulemaking raised fascinating issues concerning
the definitions of "device" and "drug," which were explored at length in
the preambles to the proposed and final rules. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug.
16, 1995); 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). We have already mentioned
FDA's expansive approach to establishing the "intended use" of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco in the absence of representations by the manufacturers. Supra p. 47. Another important interpretive issue was whether
there are unstated common sense limitations on the categories of ''drug'
and "device" as defined by the FD&C Act.
i
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As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, courts use a "common
sense" approach in interpreting the FD&C Act's definition of "food." The
circular brevity of that definition leaves them with little other choice. By
contrast, the more detailed definitions of "drug" and "device" are less
obvious candidates for the imposition of implied limitations. However, the
plain language of these definitions encompasses an enormous range of
products not traditionally viewed as being within FDA's authority. This is
particularly true of the definition of "device," which embraces products
that do not act primarily through chemical action or metabolization. As the
tobacco manufacturers pointed out repeatedly in attacking FDA's jurisdiction over its products, the device definition, applied literally, would include
guns and ammunition, thermal pajamas, air conditioners, scuba diving
gear, automobile airbags, and roller coasters. The industry thus argued
that a product could be treated as a device only if its intended effects on
structure or function were "therapeutic," "medical," or "beneficial." See
61 Fed. Reg. 44619, 44674-75 (Aug. 28, 1996). FDA emphatically opposed
reading such limitations into the statute. The agency also observed that, in
any event, tobacco products achieve their effects pharmacologically and are
thus indistinguishable from products that the agency has traditionally
regnlated as drugs and devices. Id. at 44675-85.
The federal district court hearing the challenge to the tobacco rule
rejected the industry's argument that the structure/function provisions
must be construed narrowly to avoid absurd implications for other types of
products. The court remarked that a statute's scope "is not to be judicially
narrowed ... by envisioning extreme possible applications." Coyne Beahm
u. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1393 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (quoting U.S. v. Sullivan,
332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948)). Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court ruled
for the tobacco industry without reaching the issue of the precise meaning
of "affect the structure or any function of the body." FDA u. Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (infra p. 82). Consequently, whether there
are any unstated limits on the definition of "device" remains an open
question. In the following 2002 letter, FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troywho had represented Brow!l & Williamson in its challenge to the agency's
regulation of cigarettes-firmly embraced the notion that the device definition encompasses consumer J'l!'Oducts only if they are marketed with claims
of therapeutic or medical utility. He also advanced a narrow interpretation
of what types of evidence can establish "intended use."

Letter from Daniel E. Troy, FDA Chief Counsel, to
Jeffrey N. Gibbs
October 17, 2002.

. . . This responds to your letters concerning Applied Digital Solutions
(ADS)'s two separate written requests submitted to the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health under Section 513(g) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) requesting a determination that the VeriChip is not a medical device under the FD&C Act for the intended uses
described in the requests. Your requests cover two different intended uses
of the product. The first is for use of the VeriChip in health information
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applications ("health information VeriChip"). The second is for security,
financial, and personal identification\safety applications ("personal ID\secu1·ity VeriChip"). For the reasons discussed below, FDA believes that the
health information VeriChip is a medical device subject to FDA's jurisdiction. FDA agrees, however, that the personal ID/security VeriChip is not
covered by the FD&C Act.
Background
Since 1986, Digital Angel Corporation, which is working with VeriChip
Corporation, has sold more than 20 million implantable RFID transponders
for animals. . . . The transponders provide access to information necessary
to identify the animal.
In January of 1984, the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) within
FDA issued a letter to the manufacturer of this product stating: ". . . The
device does not have a medical\therapeutic function. Therefore, we have no
objection to marketing of this identification device for use in animals." ...
ADS has determined to market in the United States a version of the
microminiature transponder, known by the trade name "VeriChip," for a
variety of uses in human beings. We understand from ADS that the
VeriChip is a microminiature transponder that is encapsulated in medical
grade glass that may be inserted by hypodermic needle under the skin of
the upper arm in humans. The chip\transponder stores a unique identification number only. A small, handheld introducer is used to place the chip
subcutaneously. A small, handheld battery-powered scanner can read the
identification number on the chip. That number enables access to a
database.
The personal\security VeriChip would allow access, via the
database, to information related to security, financial, and personal safety
applications only. You have represented that it will not contain any medical
information. By contrast, ADS and its representatives have explained, the
health information VeriChip would allow access, via the database, to
medical history and other information to assist medical personnel in
diagnosing or treating an injury or illness.
Regulatory Status of the VeriChip
We believe that the health information product, which facilitates access
to information for use by medical professionals in treating the individual
with the VeriChip embedded in his or her arm, is "intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure [or] mitigation of
disease." The information in the database is meant to be used by medical
professionals in diagnosing a disease or other condition. Indeed, the entire
purpose of this product is for a medical professional to employ when
treating a stricken individual. For example, information about whether the
person is allergic to a particular medicine, or has an implanted pacemaker,
which is accessed in connection with the VeriChip, is intended for use in
treating the person. Accordingly, FDA has determined that the health
information VeriChip is a medical device within the meaning of Section
20l(h)(2) of the FD&C Act.
By contrast, as CVM recognized with respect to the use of the VeriChip
predecessor in animals, it does not appear that the personal ID/security
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VeriChip is a medical device, even though it is an "implant." It is of course
true that virtually any product that comes into contact with the body-and
many that do not-could be said to have an effect on the structure or a
function of the body. However ... FDA's medical device jurisdiction under
Section 20l(h)(2) extends only to such products that are marketed by their
manufacturers or distributors with claims of effects on the structure or a
function of the body. In the language of the statute itself, the product must
be "intended to" affect the structure or a function of the body. It is well
settled that intended use is determined with reference to marketing
claims ....
In [its brief in) a 1994 case, FDA stated that it "does not claim that a
device which has no medical application could 'qualify as a device under the
FD&CA.'" Courts have held that Section 20l(h)(3) only encompasses
products claimed to affect the body "in some medical-or drug-type fashion, i.e., in some way other than merely altering the appearance." An
Article ... "Sudden Change," 409 F.2d at 742 (emphasis added).
The pertinent legislative history supports this interpretation. Specifically, the Senate Report accompanying the legislation that became the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 states:
The use to which the product is to be put will determine the
category into which it will fall. . . . The manufacturer of the
article, through his representations in connection with its sale, can
determine the use to which the article is to be put.
S. Rep. No. 74-361, at 240 (1935) (emphasis added) ..
Accordingly, assuming that no medical claims are made for the personal ID\security VeriChip, and the product marketed for that purpose contains no health information, FDA can confirm that it is not a medical
device.
It is, of course, foreseeable that any implant, such as the personal
ID\security VeriChip, will have an effect on the structure and function of
the body; indeed, it will be permanently embedded under a person's skin.
However, as the Fourth Circuit recently held, a foreseeable effect on the
structure or function of the body does not establish an intended use. If the
foreseeability theory had been accepted by the courts, FDA would have won
several cases that it lost. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
Mathews, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977).
Also, if foreseeability were a permissible basis for finding an intended
use as that term is used in Section 20l(h)(3), FDA's jurisdiction would
encompass many articles having foreseeable physical effects. Yet FDA only
regulates products if they are marketed with claims of medical or therapeutic utility. For example, FDA only regulates exercise equipment as a
medical device when it is marketed with claims to prevent, treat, or
rehabilitate injury or disability. Otherwise, it is a consumer product.
In addition, if foreseeable effects were cognizable under Section
20l(h)(3), FDA's legal authority would intrude into consumer product
regulation-an area of responsibility delegated by Congress to another
federal agency. CPSC's jurisdiction extends to "consumer products," which
means "any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i)
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f"or sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the
personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a
permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or
otherwise .... " 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l). The definition expressly excludes
··drugs, devices, or cosmetics (as such terms are defined in sections 20l(g),
I h), and (i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
. )." Id.
~ 2052(a)(l)(H).
Similarly, if Section 20l(h)(3) of the FD&C Act were interpreted to
give FDA jurisdiction over any product foreseeably having an effect on the
structure or a function of the body, then regulatory authority would shift
from the CPSC to FDA for a host of non-health-related products. Hiking
boots; shirts, pants, and coats; exercise equipment; insulated gloves; airbags; and chemical sprays can be said to affect bodily structure or function.
Clothing and gloves, for example, keep the body warm.

NOTES
1. Subsequent Regulatory Treatment. Because no product similar to the health
information VeriChip was in commercial circulation prior to the 1976 enactment of
the Medical Device Amendments, FDA automatically classified it into class III in
2004, when the agency received premarket notification under section 510(k).
Immediately thereafter, however, FDA received a reclassification petition from
Digital Angel, requesting that the device be placed in class II. FDA granted this
petition in October 2004. Letter from Donna Bea-Tillman, FDA-CDER, to James
Santelli {Oct. 12, 2004). Accordingly, the agency then promulgated a new classification regulation for the class 11 ''Implantable radiofrequency transponder system for
patient identification and health information." 21 C.F.R. 880.6300. The rule identifies a guidance document as the special control for the device.
2. "Behind-the-Wall" Medical Gas Pipeline Systems. Most hospitals and many
other health care facilities have permanently installed medical gas pipeline systems
as part of their architectural infrastructure. These systems deliver medical gases
such as oxygen and nitrous oxide fl:om remote tanks to wall outlets throughout the
facility. Medical gases are prescription drugs, and medical gas delivery products on
the patients' side of the wall {such as flowmeters, gauges, tubing, and masks) are
indisputably devices. But what about the "behind-the-wall" pipes, manifolds, valves,
and connectors, typically installed by plumbing contractors? J:t"'DA originally took the
position that such systems were "part of the physical plant" rather than medical
devices. See Letter from 'Franklin K. Coombs, P.E., Biomedical Engineering Branch,
Division of Classification and Scientific Classification, FDA to Larry R. Pilot,
Director of the Division of Compliance, FDA (Jan. 3, 1977); Memorandum from
Pilot to Coombs \Jan. 10, 1977) (response confirming that oxygen supply systems
"are not devices as that term is defined in the Act"). More recently, however, the
agency has indicated that medical gas delivery distribution systems are in fact
devices under the statute. Letter from Eugene M. Berk, Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, FDA, to Howard Holstein (May 11, 1993). Nevertheless, FDA
has said it will use its regulatory discretion to exempt such systems from the legal
requirements for devices, with the exception of the general misbranding and
adulteration regulations, which still apply.
3. Leeches and Maggots. FDA treats maggots and leeches marketed for medici~
nal purposes as medical devices. Maggots, or fly larvae, are normally associated with
corpses and adulterated food, but they also help heal wounds and burns in living
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patients' tissue by liquefying dead tissue. Leeches, the bloodsucking aquatic animals
with cameo roles in the films The African Queen and Stand By Me, have been used
in medicine for thousands of years. Today, doctors use them primarily to remove
pooled blood in skin grafts and reattachment surgery. In 2004, FDA cleared
separate 510(k) applications to market each of these products as a medical device
substantially equivalent to a device sold prior to the enactment of the Medical
Device Amendments in 1976. See FDA Talk Paper, No. T04-19 (June 28, 2004).

4. Sterilizers. Federal courts have held that machines used to sterilize other
medical devices are themselves medical devices. See United States v. 22 Rectangular
or Cylindrical Devices . "The Ster-0-Lizer MD-200'', 714 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Utah
1989) (surgical instruments); United States u. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 1999)
(dental handpieces).

COMMENT: DUAL USE PRODUCTS
FDA has set forth the following policy for products that have both
medical and nonmedical uses.
FDA will regulate a multi-purpose product as a medical device if it
is intended for a medical purpose . . . FDA will determine the
intended use of a product based upon the expressions of the person
legally responsible for its labeling and by the circumstances surrounding its distribution. The most important factors the agency
will consider in determining the intended use of a particular
product are the labeling, advertising, and other representations
accompanying the product. Products that have medical uses only
are clearly intended for medical purposes, and, therefore, will be
regulated as medical devices whether or not medical claims are
made for them.
45 Fed. Reg. 60576, 60579 (Sept. 12, 1980).
FDA has taken the position that exercise equipment used in recreational and sporting activities will be regulated as medical devices only where
those products are intended for medical purposes and thus are properly
classified as "therapeutic equipment." 48 Fed. Reg. 53032, 53043-44 (Nov.
23, 1983). Similarly, the agency has concluded that "electrostatic air
cleaners are not inherently medical devices," because they have other uses
as well, and that the fact that FDA regulates the emission of ozone from
medical devices in 21 C.F.R. § 801.415 does not mean that all products
emitting ozone are medical devices. Letter from FDA Chief Counsel R.M.
Cooper to CPSC Assistant General Counsel S. Lemberg (May 14, 1979).
FDA considers magnets marketed with medical claims, including treatment of cancer or arthritis, to be medical devices. CDRH Consumer
Information (Mar. 1, 2000). Similarly, the FDA website states that the
agency considers clothes that are labeled or promoted as providing protection against the sun or limiting exposure to the sun's UVA/UVB rays to be
medical devices. FDA imposed unapproved device status on an electric gas
grill igniter advertised to relieve various kinds of pain when used to send
an electric current into acupressure points on the body. A federal appeals
court upheld this determination. U.S. v. Universal Management Services,
Inc., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999).
~
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FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS

United States v. 23 ... Articles
192 F.2d 308 i2d Cir. 1951) .
•

WOODBURY. CIRCUIT JUDGE.

The United States of America filed a libel
seeking the seizure and
condemnation of certain phonograph records, and various accompanying
items of p1inted and graphic matter, all of which were moving or had
moved in interstate commerce. The phonograph records were entitled in
part "Time To Sleep," and their accompanying literature consists of (1) an
album in part entitled, "De Luxe Records Presents Time To Sleep a Tested
Method of Inducing Sleep Conceived and Transcribed by Ralph Slater," (2)
a leaflet in part reading: "Sleep Witb This Amazing Record 'Time to
Sleep,' " 13) a certificate entitled "Sleep Guaranteed,'' (4) display cards
entitled "De Luxe Records Presents Time to Sleep,'' and (5) a poster
headed "A 'Dream Girl' Shows a New Way to Dreamland."
Section 20l(h) of the Act under consideration provides in material part
that "[t]he term 'device'
means instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, intended (1) for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals."
Certainly a phonograph record, if not itself an instrument or an
apparatus, is a contrivance. And moreover, it is without question a component, part or accessory of a phonograph, or like record playing machine,
which in its turn is without any doubt at all an instrument, apparatus or
contrivance. The real question therefore is whether the libeled records were
intended for either of the uses described in (1) or (2) of § 20l(h), supra.
Obviously the records were intended for use in the cure, mitigation,
treatment or perhaps prevention of insomnia. But the medical experts who
testified at the trial were agreed that insomnia is not a disease, but is a
symptom of a disease, usually although not necessarily a neurological one,
or of an emotional disturbance of some kind. Thus it may be argued that
the records do not fall within the coverage of (1) above.
However, all the expert witnesses who testified on the point were
unanimous that sleep is a function of the body, or body and mind, of man
and other animals, and this testimony brings the records within the terms
of (2), supra, for their intended use was to affect that function, i.e. to
induce sleep in those who needed it but had difficulty in obtaining enough.
Without further laboring the point it will suffice to say that the records
involved are "devices within the meaning of § 20l(h)(2) of the Act .... "

United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Article of
Device
Med. Devices Rep. (CCHl fl 15,055 (W.D. Mich. 1982).

This is an action by the United States . . seeking the condemnation
and forfeiture of thirty-two different tape recordings, marketed by the
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claimant, Potentials Unlimited, Inc. under various titles. These tape recordings were initially seized, pursuant to warrant, on January 6, 1981. The
tapes sought to be condemned include:
1.

"Relief of Back Pain" or "Back Pain)}

2.

"Removal of Warts"

3.

"Bust Enlargement" or "Natural Bust Enlargement"

4.

"Migraine Relief" or "Headaches"

. . . . [28 additional titles suggesting disease or structure/function effects]
Although the claimant disputes whether the labeling of the tapes is
false or misleading and whether they lack adequate directions for use, it
does not dispute that the tapes were manufactured in an unregistered
establishment, that the tapes themselves are not registered as medical
devices, or that there was no premarket notification of their manufacture
and sale. It follows that if, in fact, the tapes are medical devices, they are in
violation of the Act and are subject to forfeiture. Therefore, the resolution
of this action turns upon one question; are these tapes medical devices
within the meaning of the Act? ....
In January, 1981 Potentials Unlimited marketed over 100 tape recordings. Most of these are unrelated to health or medical problems, as
evidenced by the fact that only 32 of the tapes are under seizure. The
catalogue distributed by Potentials identifies many different "self-hypnosis" tapes with such titles as "Memory," "Good Study Habits," "Fear of
Flying/' "Stop Smoking," "Freedom from Guilt," "Jealousy," "Self-Confidence," "How to be Popular," "Be a Better Bowler," and "How to be a
Great Golfer." ... The tapes are divided, by the catalogue, into several
different "series." Most of the seized tapes fall under the "Health Series"
although a few are listed under other categories.
The Potentials Unlimited catalogue comprises the most significant and
detailed promotional literature used to market the tapes .... The introduction refers to the tape recordings, at one point, as "learning"; however,
read as a whole, the introduction leaves the impression that the positive
suggestions contained on the tapes will act upon the "subconscious mind"
to automatically bring about the changes which a person desires. Any
teaching and learning aspects of the tapes are deemphasized or negated by
the reference to "magic" and the implication that the tapes will work
better, "without any interference from your conscious mind." Indeed, the
introduction suggests that the tapes will be more beneficial if played during
sleep, rather than actually being listened to and assimilated.
The catalogue distributed in 1981 contains a disclaimer on page 3, in
small but easily legible print, which states:
No therapeutic claims of any kind are made with regard to
these tape programs. We believe cures or improvements are a
· matter of mind over matter and these tapes are not intended as a
substitute for seeing your physician, or for medical treatment.
Parental guidance is suggested for children's use.
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An earlier version of this disclaimer was introduced into the catalogue
sometime in 1980 after the FDA had begun investigating Potentials Unlimited in February of that year. In previous catalogues no such disclaimer was
included.
The general introduction applies to all of the self-hypnosis tapes. The
separate descriptive paragraphs contained in the catalogue refer by title
and content to specific tapes and the specific problem or aspect of a
person's life which that tape is designed to improve. The paragraphs are
not specific regarding how the tapes work, instead they are anecdotal and
conversational attempts to interest the reader in the specific tape. When
combined with the general introduction, the individual descriptions generally leave the impression that the tapes will cure or treat the specific
health-related problem indicated by the title of the tape.
Generally there is no dispute that the tapes purport to effect [sic]
structures or functions of the body or to mitigate the effects of diseases ..
The tape recordings themselves are very similar in style, structure, and
content. They begin with brief instructions regarding the use and purpose
of the particular tape, a standard hypnotic induction, and a series of
statements, descriptions of visual images, and suggestions designed to
influence the listener's thinking. Many of the images are repeated in more
than one tape.
All of tbe tapes clearly convey a number of related ideas revolving
around a central theme, i.e. that a person's thoughts can influence their
health or physical characteristics. This central theme is developed through
an emphasis on the benefits of relaxation, the elimination of negative
feelings such as anger, hate and jealousy, the creation of a positive selfimage, and the idea that reality is a reflection of one's own perceptions.
Thus, according to the tapes, if a person thinks of himself in a particular,
desired way, such as thin, free of allergies or pain, or generally healthy, the
person will actually take on those desired characteristics. The tapes are
clearly designed to communicate both this central tenet, and a method for
putting it into practice.
The court does not find that the tapes themselves are, apart from the
claims made in the catalogue, designed or intended to be used in the cure
or treatment of the physical and mental conditions indicated by their titles.
Each tape is designed to teach a method of mental therapy which it is
claimed will have beneficial effects on a particular aspect of a person's life.
Any therapeutic results flow from the listener's successful implementation
of the lessons contained on the tape. The purported "treatment", therefore,
consists of the new thought patterns, beliefs, and behaviors which the
listener has learned and adopted. The lessons contained on the tapes are
communicated linguistically, and can be understood as well by reading
transcripts of the tapes as by listening to the tapes. The contents of the
tapes could also be transmitted directly between two individuals, using
speech, without the use of tape recording devices. Therefore, the court finds
that the mechanical components of these tape recordings are not part of
any medical treatment and are used only as a means of communicating the
verbal ideas and methods found on the tapes.
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The tapes use hypnosis and hypnotic suggestion to communicate the
ideas which they contain. The American Medical Association has recognized
hypnosis as a useful "modality" for medical treatment, when used in
conjunction with other treatments, since 1957. There are controlled studies
indicating that hypnosis techniques may be useful in the removal of warts,
the treatment of asthma, the mitigation of all kinds of pain, the reduction
of myopia (near-sightedness), and in enlarging the female bust. In addition,
there are anecdotal reports of the successful use of hypnosis to cure or treat
virtually every condition encompassed by the 32 self-hypnosis tapes under
seizure. Scientific research regarding the use of hypnosis in treating these
other conditions has generally been negative. No research has been done,
specifically, regarding the use of hypnotic tape recordings ..
The fundamental finding regarding hypnosis, as it impacts upon this
case, is that hypnosis is an ill defined and little understood concept which it
is at least possible to view as a special form of communication or as a
teaching device. This finding is significant since the court has found that
the tapes under seizure communicate several clearly identifiable ideas.
Since hypnosis can be considered a form of communication, the fact that
the tapes use hypnosis techniques, does not prevent their classification as
communication or teaching devices. The court rejects Dr. Reyher's testimony that communication must be logical, rational, or objectively purposeful.
His definition of communication, besides being outside his field of expertise
(as he readily admitted) would exclude poetry, art, music, and drama from
the area of communication. Whatever the merits of such a restricted
definition for some purposes, it does not comport with the ordinary concept
of communication and is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes.
There is no evidence that the self-hypnosis tapes manufactured by
Potentials Unlimited can actually achieve the results which are claimed in
the Potential catalogue. The tapes could be harmful if they caused someone
to delay seeking adequate medical care for a disease condition. Additionally,
the uncontrolled use of hypnosis could be dangerous because persons could
develop anxiety reactions to some of the suggestions contained on the
tapes.
This case illustrates the difficulty which inevitably arises in balancing
the ideal of philosophical and economic freedom against the practical need
to protect unwary and vulnerable individuals from the claims of rapacious
and unethical businessmen. . . . Underlying this case, of course, is the
fundamental question of whether consumers should be allowed the choice
of buying Potentials Unlimited self-hypnosis tapes without the prior intervention and approval of the Federal government in the form of the Food
and Drug Administration.
Representing the other side of the balancing dilemma is society's
concern for the gullible or the desperate individual who is induced to forego
necessary medical treatment by the fraudulent, or simply mistaken, claims
of the purveyors of medical drugs and devices. Although the construction
and fantastic claims made for many quack devices over the years often
seem quite amusing, use of these devices can have serious health consequences. Whether sold to a consumer or a health professional, a device
which does not perform as promised may pose a risk to health as well as an

•
D

DRUGS AND DEVICES

l'Conom1c detriment to the purchaser. Reliance on unwarranted claims
n1ade for a device, recommending use in serious disease conditions, may
induce the purchaser to forego seeking timely and appropriate medical
Lreatment.
Fortunately, the court need not confront the problem presented in this
case from the fundamental level of balancing the costs and benefits of the
two competing perspectives suggested above. Congress has already engaged
in such a balancing process and has determined that "medical devices"
should be regulated by the FDA for the protection and benefit of the
consuming public seeking medical treatment. In doing so, Congress has
adopted a broad definition of medical device which is to be liberally
construed in order to effectuate the purpose of the Act. United States v.
Bacto-Unidish, 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
There is no doubt that a tape recording is an implement, apparatus, or
contrivance [as required by the FD&C Act definition]. However, a distinction must be made in this case between the tapes themselves, and the ideas
that are contained on the tapes. Congress did not intend to regulate an
article or device, the sole function of which is to serve as a means of
communicating health related ideas or information. Had Congress had such
an intent it would have expressly included books, the quintessential communication device, in the definition of "medical device." It did not do so.
The idea that a person can control and improve their [sic] health in
general, or specific physical conditions, through the intervention of their
thoughts, i.e. with their minds, is simply that, an idea, which anyone,
including the claimant in this case, is free to helieve, to disseminate, and,
unless specifically prohibited, to act upon as they wish by virtue of the First
Amendment. As found by the court, tbe tape recordings under seizure in
this case are designed and intended to communicate ard to teach certain
ideas, beliefs, and mental processes which are claimed to have health
benefits when adopted and practiced by the listener. Congress did not
purport to regulate quack medical ideas or beliefs when it drafted the
definition of medical device contained in the Act. By no stretch of language
can an idea or a mental process be considered an instrument, apparatus,
implement, machine, contrivance) implant, or in vitro reagent, or a similar
or related article.
The "liberal interpretation" to be accorded the Act must yield somewhat when it comes into conflict with First Amendment freedoms ....
Since ideas, beliefs and mental processes do not come within the statutory
definition they are outside the jurisdiction of the FDA. Mechanical devices
which do no more than communicate or expound such ideas, beliefs and
mental processes are likewise outside the jurisdiction of the FDA. To
include such devices within the definition would have grave First Amendment implications and would, by implication, bring health related books,
magazines, and publications within tbe agency jurisdiction. That is a result
Congress clearly did not contemplate or intend.
The fact that the tapes in issue do no more than communicate certain
ideas using hypnosis as a tool in that communication does not end the
inquiry into whether these tapes, as marketed by Potentials Unlimited, are
subject to regulation as medical devices. Articles and devices which have no
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intended therapeutic qualities may be regulated if they are sold by the
vendor accompanied by therapeutic claims. Thus, the seller's objective
manifestation of a therapeutic intent brings otherwise medically benign
articles within the purview of the Act ....
The therapeutic claims contained in promotional literature can convert
the most innocent of articles into drugs or devices within the meaning of
the Act .... The conduct of Potentials Unlimited in marketing these tapes
as therapeutic medical devices is subject to regulation by Congress, even if
the tapes themselves communicate ideas.
As stated in the court's findings of fact, the catalogue distributed by
Potentials Unlimited tells the reader through its general introduction, that
the self-hypnosis tapes will work "like magic," by "saturating the subconscious mind with positive suggestions." This language creates the expectation of an automatic and mechanical process by which suggestions will be
implanted in the brain, much like a drug, and miraculous cures will result
from the therapeutic effects of these suggestions. The whole introduction is
designed to imply a therapeutic result from listening to the tapes, rather
than a simple act of communication. Hypnosis is regarded, in the catalogue,
as a treatment rather than a form of communication. Coupled with the
titles of the seized tapes, an intended therapeutic use for the tapes is
objectively manifested. This objective manifestation makes the tapes, as
they are presently marketed, medical devices, to the extent they are used in
treating disease or to affect body function ....
The petition for condemnation against the . . . tapes . . . is granted ....

Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer
Products
52 Fed. Reg. 36104 (September 25, 1987).

FDA is making available for public comment draft policy guidance for
the regulation of computer products. The draft policy guidance clarifies
how FDA would apply existing statutory requirements to the regulation of
computer products (i.e., both hardware and software) when such products
meet the definition of a medical device in the Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 ....
Under the draft policy, FDA would not regard computer products used
only for traditional "library" functions such as storage, retrieval, and
dissemination of information-functions traditionally carried out through
textbooks and journals-to be medical devices subject to regulation by the
agency. Similarly, the policy notes that FDA's device regulations and
authorities also would not apply to computer products used for general
accounting or communications functions or solely for instructional purposes, rather than to diagnose or treat patients.
When a computer product is a "component, part, or accessory" of a
product recognized as a medical device in its own right, the computer
component is regulated according to the requirements for the parent device
(unless the component of the device is separately classified).
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Computer products which are medical devices, and not components,
parts, or accessories of other articles which are themselves medical devices,
are regulated with the least degree of control necessary to provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. For example, many software
products known as "expert" or "knowledge based" systems that are not
used with existing medical devices and that are intended to involve competent human intervention before any impact on human health occurs (e.g.,
where clinical judgment and experience can be used to check and interpret
a system's output) are exempt from registration, listing, premarket notification, and premarket approval requirements. FDA is also not aware of any
computer product that is not a component, part, or accessory of another
device that would require la]
premarket approval (PMA) application
before marketing.
The agency is cognizant of the need to safeguard First Amendment
protections and recognizes that, in some cases, it may be difficult to make a
clear distinction between software products that perform traditional
"book" or "library" functions, and software products that fall within the
definition of a medical device under the draft policy, based on their
intended use in the diagnosis or management of health-related conditions.
FDA believes flexible guidance is necessary for effective implementation of
the medical devices law and specifically invites comments on the appropriateness of the approach taken in the draft policy.

NOTES
Further Developments. A November 13, 1989, revised draft ufthe POLICY FOR
reiterated the basic statements of the 1987
draft. FDA has never finalized the policy. The agency has more recently announced
that it is considering establishing a risk*based classification of stand~alone computer
software products that fit the definition of a medical device, but it has not taken
any further action. 65 Fed. Reg. 73822 (Nov. 30, 2000). See generally Bruce M.
Fried & Jason M. Zuckerman, FDA Regulation of Medical Software, 33 J. HEALTH L.
129 (2000); E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and
Regulation of Medical Device Software, 52 Foon & DRUG L.J. 511 (1997); Dee Simons,
Medical Device Software Regulation; An Industry Perspective, 52 FooD & DRUG L.J.
189 (1997).
2. Specific Case. In FDA Regulatory Letter BOS-88-10 (June 23, 1988), FDA
Boston District Director E. J. McDonnell took the position that a computerized
blood bank and laboratory management system that takes data directly from
automated blood analyzers and uses it as the basis for labeling blood and blood
components is a medical device and subject to the premarket notification requireM
ments of section 510(k). This position was reaffirmed in 1994 in a letter from CBER
Director Kathryn C. Zoon to Blood Establishment Computer Software Manufactur~
ers (Mar. 31, 1994).
1.

THE REGULATION OF COMPUTER PRODUCTS

E.

IMPLICIT LIMITS ON

FDA's JURISDICTION: ToBAcco

In 1995, FDA announced that it was going to assert jurisdiction over
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco and regulate their manufacture, labeling,
and advertising. For legal authority, the agency invoked the FD&C Act.
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Contending that tobacco products were responsible for as many as 400,000
American deaths annually, the agency mounted what it considered a
compelling case for government intervention. The agency's goal was to
protect adolescents who had not yet begun to smoke. Its plan was designed
to obstruct their access to tobacco and discourage manufacturer promotional efforts to attract new smokers. FDA's notice of proposed rulemaking
immediately precipitated litigation that probed the boundaries of the agency's legal authority. The eventual failure of FDA's initiative exposed new
limits of the Act's definitions as measures of its regulatory jurisdiction.
Decades before the 1995 announcement, FDA had asserted its authority over at least some tobacco products. Shortly after World War II, the
agency successfully challenged the marketing of two brands of cigarettes
that it claimed were illegal drugs. In United States v. 46 Cartons ..
Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953), FDA seized a shipment
of cigarettes whose labeling "represents that the article is effective in
preventing respiratory disease, common cold, influenza, pneumonia" and
more than a dozen other illnesses. The government charged that these
express claims made Fairfax Cigarettes a "drug" under the Act, and thus
that the product required FDA approval. The district court agreed and
ordered the seized goods relabeled or destroyed. The manufacturer, of
course, abandoned the challenged claims, effectively depriving FDA of
jurisdiction. A similar result followed FDA's seizure of another brand of
cigarettes making weight-loss claims. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons
Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959).
FDA thereafter appears to have lost interest in contesting the health
claims made for different brands of cigarettes. Within a decade, however,
Congress began to explore measures to combat the health effects of tobacco.
In 1964 the Surgeon General released a ground-breaking report which
documented the heavy price smokers paid for the pleasure of smoking. See
SMOKING AND HEALTH. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964). The report inspired several
proposals to regulate the manufacture, labeling, and sale of cigarettes and,
later, of smokeless tobacco. During congressional hearings on these bills,
FDA officials were asked what, if any, role their agency could play. Their
uniform response was that FDA had no authority over cigarettes unless
they bore claims that they could prevent or relieve disease.
Ultimately, suggestions that FDA be given authority to regulate cigarettes were rejected in favor of statutes passed in 1965 and 1969 curbing
the labeling and, later, the advertising for cigarettes and requiring their
labels to bear mild warnings about their health effects. The 1960s came to
an end with no material change in the marketing of cigarettes despite
mounting evidence of their adverse effects.
Advocates of tobacco control, however, never lost hope that FDA might
be persuaded to acknowledge, and then exercise, jurisdiction over tobacco.
In 1977, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), a citizen action group, filed
a petition urging the agency to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes under the
FD&C Act and impose restrictions on their advertising and distribution.
The petition cited evidence that smokers smoked to gain the physiological
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"lfocts of nicotine, and it contended that these effects were thus "intend' ·cl." Once again, FDA declined to exercise jurisdiction:
The petitioners have presented no evidence that manufacturers or
vendors of cigarettes represent that the cigarettes are "intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man .... " 21
U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(C). Statements by the petitioners and citations
in the petition that cigarettes are used by smokers to affect the
structure or any functions of their bodies are not evidence of such
intent by the manufacturers or vendors of cigarettes, as required
under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 32l(g)(l)(C).
Letter memorandum from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner, FDA, to ASH
!Dec. 5, 1977), quoted in Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d
236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The D.C. Circuit upheld FDA's refusal to regulate cigarettes in the
following words:
[B]y failing to introduce any evidence of vendors' intent-whether based upon subjective vendor claims or objective evidence
such as labeling, promotional material, and advertising-ASH
placed itself in the position of having to meet the high standard
established in cases where the statutory "intent" is derived from
consumer use alone. Clearly, it is well established "that the
'intended use' of a product, within the meaning of the Act, is
determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional
claims, advertising, and any other relevant source." Whether evidence of consumer intent is a "relevant source" for these purposes
depends upon whether such evidence is strong enough to justify an
inference as to the vendors' intent. This requires a substantial
showing.
In cases such as the one at hand, consumers must use the
product predominantly-and in fact nearly exclusively-with the
appropriate intent before the requisite statutory intent can be
inferred. . ASH did not establish, and arguably cannot establish,
the near-exclusivity of consumer use of cigarettes with the intent
"to affect the structure or any function of the body of man. . . "
Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-40 ID.C. Cir.
1980).
In separate petitions, ASH also requested FDA to assert jurisdiction
over both attached and detached cigarette filters as medical devices, based
on a recommendation by an FDA advisory committee that they be classified
as class III under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. Following a
court order to rule on the petitions, Action on Smoking and Health v. Food
and Drug Administration, FDLI 1978-1980 Jud. Rec. 862 (D.D.C. 1980),
FDA denied both in a letter from Deputy Commissioner M. Novitch to J.F.
Banzhaf, III, FDA Dkt Nos. 77P-0185 & 78P-0338/CP (Nov. 25, 1980).
Both FDA and the D.C. Circuit in ASH left open the possibility that
the agency might be able to assert jurisdiction over cigarettes if there were
evidence that the manufacturers themselves intended their products to
"affect the structure or function of the body." Events soon reopened this
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line of analysis. In the early 1990s, several states sued the major manufacturers of cigarettes to recover the costs of state-funded medical care
provided to smokers suffering from tobacco-related illness. In the course of
discovery in these cases, some of the defendants disgorged documents that
strongly suggested, and in the view of many proved beyond question, that
the companies knew their customers smoked to gain the effects of nicotine
and designed their products to satisfy this desire. These disclosures provided FDA the opportunity to revisit the issue left open by the ASH case:
Could sellers of tobacco products be said to intend the bodily effects of
nicotine?
FDA faced this question shortly after the appointment of a new
Commissioner, David Kessler. A series of petitions renewed demands that
the agency assert jurisdiction over cigarettes as "drugs" or "devices" and
take steps to curb or prohibit their sale. Kessler launched FDA's own
extensive investigation into the cigarette business-how they were made
and marketed, and what the manufacturers knew or intended about their
effects. At the same time, agency lawyers were directed to design a plan for
regulating cigarettes that would substantially dampen their appeal to
younger people, without threatening an outright ban that could cause
Congress to intervene.
Shortly afterwards, FDA published a notice of proposed rulemaking in
which it asserted jurisdiction over cigarettes as a "device" for delivering
the "drug" nicotine. 60 Fed. Reg. 41314 (Aug. 11, 1995). The agency
proposed measures to make cigarettes difficult for young people to obtain
and less appealing to consumers generally, including mandatory carding of
youthful customers, relocation of cigarette displays, and outright bans on
the industry's favorite promotions, including sponsorship of concerts, art
exhibits, and sporting events. To support this proposal, FDA contended
that the evidence from company files made clear that the cigarette manufacturers did "intend" their products to affect the bodily functions of their
customers. In addition, the agency asserted that the FD&C Act allowed a
range of remedial options short of an outright ban.
The cigarette manufacturers, along with representatives of advertising
interests who saw FDA's prop'{."ed curbs on promotion as an assault on the
First Amendment, did not wait for the rulemaking to conclude; they
brought suit immediately, contending that FDA's lack of jurisdiction was so
obvious that they need not exhaust the opportunity for comment that the
agency had provided. The exhaustion question was never resolved, because
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina,
where the manufacturers had chosen to file their suit, did not take up the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment until after publication of
FDA's final rule in 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (Aug. 28, 1996). In its preamble to
the final rule, the agency made some adjustments to its defense of its
jurisdiction and more significant revisions to its regulatory scheme, but its
fundamental claims remained the same. The agency contended that the
evidence now revealed that cigarettes were intended by their manufacturers to affect the body by delivering nicotine and that FDA could restrict
their promotion and sale as "devices" without having to confront the Act's
categorical ban of any "drug" that cannot be shown to be safe.
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The District Court scheduled a full day of argument on the cross
111otions for summary judgment. Within a few weeks of the argument,
.ludge Osteen rendered a decision that was widely interpreted as a victory
rm· FDA. It focused on the central issue of the agency's jurisdiction to
regulate.
The precise question presented to the court is whether Congress has evidenced its clear intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed. The
inquiry as to whether Congress bas directly spoken to the issue
should begin with an examination of the text of the FDCA. A
product is subject to the FDCA if it meets the statute's definition
of a "food,)) ''drug," "device," or "cosmetic." Rather than itemize
each product subject to regulation under the FDCA, Congress
defined these categories broadly so that each encompasses a wide
range of products.
[T]be court finds that tobacco products fit within the
FDCA's definitions of "drug" and "device." Therefore, Plaintiffs
must prove to the court that Congress has expressed its clear
intent to withhold from FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products in some place other than the text of the FDCA ..
This court is convinced that neither the text nor the
legislative history of the FDCA evidences clear congressional intent to withhold from FDA authority to regulate tobacco products ..
FDA offers that tobacco products fall within the FDCA's
definitions of "drugs" and "devices" because tl1ey are "intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body." FDA explains
that the nicotine in tobacco products affects the structure or
function of the body by causing and sustaining addiction and by
acting as a stimulant, sedative, and weight regulator. FDA further
argues that manufacturers intend nicotine to produce such effects.
Plaintiffs claim that a product's "intended use" can be established only by manufacturer representations about the product. 30
FDA counters that it appropriately relied on evidence of foreseeability, consumer use, and internal manufacturer memoranda to
establish intended use. The text, legislative history, and past
judicial and agency interpretation of the structure-or-function definitions of "drug" and "device" reveal that intended use may be
established by evidence other than manufacturer representations.
Although the regulations defining "intended use" [21
C.F.R. 201.128, 801.4] clearly anticipate the establishment of intended use through evidence of promotional claims, the plain
language does not prohibit the establishment of intended use by
30. FDA does not contend that tobacco
1nanufacturers make any representations in
connection with the sale of tobacco products.
Therefore, if intended use can be established

only by manufacturer representations, tobacco products would not be subject to regulation pursuant to the FDCA.
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other evidence. To illustrate, the regulations specifically provide
that intent may be shown by circumstances surrounding the sale
of the article and that one such circumstance could be the offering
and use of a product for a purpose for which it is neither advertised nor labeled with the manufacturer's knowledge. The regulations defining "intended use" do not prohibit reliance on evidence
other than manufacturer representations to establish intended
use.
Plaintiffs infer that Congress intended for the structure-orfunction definition of device to "apply only to products that are
marketed to provide some medical or other health benefit to
users." They support their argument in part by noting that
Congress entitled its 1976 amendments to the FDCA's device
provisions the "Medical Device Amendments" ("MDA"). The definition of device, however, expressly includes those products "intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals" and gives no indication that it is to apply only to
those devices with a medical purpose. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) ..
Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 966 F. Supp.
1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
On one important issue, however, Judge Osteen's opinion disappointed
FDA. He ruled that the FD&C Act did not authorize the agency-by
invoking its power to "restrict" the "sale" of a device--to impose any
limits on its advertising. This issue, discussed infra p. 1051, was briefed on
appeal but was not reached by the Fourth Circuit, which, by a 2-1 vote,
overturned Judge Osteen's ruling upholding FDA's assertion of jurisdiction.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation v. Food and Drug Administration, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1999). Predictably, the Supreme Court granted
the government's Petition for Certiorari.
The opposing opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer focused
on several questions that together framed the issue of FDA's jurisdiction.
Could an article's "intended" use be shown by evidence of tbe manufacturers' private plans? Did the e"vidence assembled by FDA establish that
cigarettes are intended to produce drug-like effects? Did the Act's requirements permit the continued sale of a drug or device that the agency had
said was unsafe? And, critically, had Congress left FDA free to invoke its
authority under the FD&C Act?

Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.
529 U.S. 120 (2000).

•JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The FDA's assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products is
founded on its conclusions that nicotine is a "drug" and that cigarettes and
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smokeless tobacco are "drug delivery devices." Again, the FDA found that
tobacco products are "intended" to deliver the pharmacological effects of
satisfying addiction, stimulation and tranquilization, and weight control
because those effects are foreseeable to any reasonable manufacturer,
consumers use tobacco products to obtain those effects, and tobacco manufacturers have designed their products to produce those effects. As an
initial matter, respondents take issue with the FDA's reading of "intended," arguing that it is a term of art that refers exclusively to claims made
by the manufacturer or vendor about the product. That is, a product is not
a drug or device under the FDCA unless the manufacturer or vendor makes
some express claim concerning the product's therapeutic benefits. We need
not resolve this question, however, because assuming, arguendo, that a
product can be "intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body" absent claims of therapeutic or medical benefit, the FDA's claim to
jurisdiction contravenes the clear intent of Congress.
A threshold issue is the appropriate framework for analyzing the
FDA's assertion of authority to regulate tobacco products. Because this case
involves an administrative agency's construction of a statute that it administers, our analysis is governed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevrc~, a reviewing
court must first ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue." Id., at 842. If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at an
end; the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." Id., at 843. But if Congress has not specifically addressed the
question, a reviewing court inust respect the agency's construction of the
statute so long as it is permissible.
In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a
particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning-or ambiguity-of
certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.
A court must therefore interpret the statute "as a symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme," Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569
(1995), and "fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole," FTC v.
Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959). Similarly, the meaning of
one statute may be affected hy other Acts, particularly where Congress has
spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand. In addition,
we mnst be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and
political magnitude to an administrative agency.
With these principles in mind, we find that Congress has directly
spoken to the issue here and precluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products.
Viewing the FDCA as a whole, it is evident that one of the Act's core
objectives is to ensure that any product regulated by the FDA is "safe" and
"effective" for its intended use. This essential purpose pervades the
FDCA.
Thus, the Act generally requires the FDA to prevent the
marketing of any drug or device where the "potential for inflicting death or
physical injury is not offaet by the possibility of therapeutic benefit."
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979).
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In its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA quite exhaustively documented
that "tobacco products are unsafe," "dangerous," and "cause great pain
and suffering from illness." It found that the consumption of tobacco
products presents "extraordinary health risks," and that "tobacco use is
the single leading cause of preventable death in the United States." ...
These findings logically imply that, if tobacco products were "devices"
under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to remove them from the
market ....
Second, the FDCA requires the FDA to place all devices that it
regulates into one of three classifications. See § 360c(b)(l) .... Given the
FDA's findings regarding the health consequences of tobacco use, the
agency would have to place cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in Class III
because, even after the application of the Act's available controls, they
would "present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(C). As Class III devices, tobacco products would be
subject to the FDCA's premarket approval process. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(l)(Cl; 21 U.S.C. § 360e. Under these provisions, the FDA would
be prohibited from approving an application for premarket approval without "a showing of reasonable assurance that such device is safe under the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested on the labeling
thereof." 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A). In view of the FDA's conclusions
regarding the health effects of tobacco use, the agency would have no basis
for finding any such reasonable assurance of safety. Thus, once the FDA
fulfilled its statutory obligation to classify tobacco products, it could not
allow them to be marketed.
In determining whether Congress has spoken directly to the FDA's
authority to regulate tobacco, we must also consider in greater detail the
tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over the past 35
years ....
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965
addressing the problem of tobacco use and human health ....
In adopting each statute, Congress has acted against the backdrop of
the FDA's consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority
under the FDCA to regulate tobacco absent claims of therapeutic benefit by
the manufacturer. In fact, on several occasions over this period, and after
the health consequences of tobacco use and nicotine's pharmacological
effects had become well known, Congress considered and rejected bills that
would have granted the FDA such jurisdiction. Under these circumstances,
it is evident that Congress' tobacco-specific statutes have effectively ratified
the FDA's long-held position that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to
regulate tobacco products. Congress has created a distinct regulatory
scheme to address the problem of tobacco and health, and that scheme, as
presently constructed, precludes any role for the FDA ....
. . . Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with
Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress
has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here. For
these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
is affirmed.
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is so ordered.
• JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE
I ; 1NSBURG join, dissenting.
II

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the authority to regulate "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any
!"unction of the body .... " Unlike the majority, I believe that tobacco
products fit within this statutory language.
In its own interpretation, the majority nowhere denies the following
two salient points. First, tobacco products (including cigarettes) fall within
the scope of this statutory definition, read literally. Cigarettes achieve their
mood-stabilizing effects through the interaction of the chemical nicotine
and the cells of the central nervous system. Both cigarette manufacturers
and smokers alike know of, and desire, that chemically induced result.
Hence, cigarettes are "intended to affect" the body's "structure" and
"function," in the literal sense of these words.
Second, the statute's basic purpose-the protection of public healthsupports the inclusion of cigarettes within its scope .... Unregulated tobacco use causes "[m]ore than 400,000 people [to] die each year from tobaccorelated illnesses, such as cancer, respiratory illnesses, and heart disease."
61 Fed. Reg. 44398 (1996). Indeed, tobacco products kill more people in this
country every year "than
AIDS .. , car accidents, alcohol, homicides,
illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined." Ibid. (emphasis added).
Taken literally, [the structure/function] definition might include
everything from room air conditioners to thermal pajamas. The companies
argue that, to avoid such a result, the meaning of "drug" or "device"
should be confined to medical or therapeutic products, narrowly defined.
The companies may well be right that the statute should not be read to
cover room air conditioners and winter underwear. But I do not agree that
we must accept their proposed limitation. For one thing, such a cramped
reading contravenes the established purpose of the statutory language. For
another, the companies' restriction would render the other two "drug"
definitions superfluous. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 32l(g)(l)(A), (g)(l)(B) (covering
articles in the leading pharmacology compendia and those "intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease").
Most importantly, the statute's language itself supplies a different,
more suitable, limitation: that a "drug" must be a chemical agent. The
FDCA's "device" definition states that an article which affects the structure or function of the body is a "device" only if it "does not achieve its
primary intended purposes through chemical action within ... the body,''
and "is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its
primary intended purposes." § 32l(h) (emphasis added). One can readily
infer from this language that at least an article that does achieve its
primary purpose through chemical action within the body and that is
dependent upon being metabolized is a "drug," provided that it otherwise
falls within the scope of the "drug" definition. And one need not hypothesize about air conditioners or thermal pajamas to recognize that the
chemical nicotine, an important tobacco ingredient, meets this test ....
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The tobacco companies' principal definitional argument focuses upon
the statutory word "intended." The companies say that "intended" in this
context is a term of art. They assert that the statutory word "intended"
means that the product's maker has made an express claim about the effect
that its product will have on the body. Indeed, according to the companies,
the FDA's inability to prove that cigarette manufacturers make such claims
is precisely why that agency historically has said it lacked the statutory
power to regulate tobacco.
The FDCA, however, does not use the word "claimed"; it uses the
word "intended." And the FDA long ago issued regulations that say the
relevant "intent" can be shown not only by a manufacturer's "expressions," but also "by the circumstances surrounding the distribution of the
article." 21 CFR § 801.4. Thus, even in the absence of express claims, the
FDA has regulated products that affect the body if the manufacturer wants,
and knows, that consumers so use the product ....
Nor is the FDA's "objective intent" interpretation unreasonable. It
falls well within the established scope of the ordinary meaning of the word
"intended." And the companies acknowledge that the FDA can regulate a
drug-like substance in the ordinary circumstance, i.e., where the manufacturer makes an express claim, so it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
agency retains such power where a product's effects on the body are so well
known (say, like those of aspirin or calamine lotion), that there is no need
for express representations because the product speaks for itself. ...
The majority nonetheless reaches the "inescapable conclusion" that
the language and structure of the FDCA as a whole "simply do not fit" the
kind of public health problem that tobacco creates. That is because, in the
majority's view, the FDCA requires the FDA to ban outright "dangerous"
drugs or devices (such as cigarettes); yet, the FDA concedes that an
immediate and total cigarette-sale ban is inappropriate .. , .
In my view, where linguistically permissible, we should interpret the
FDCA in light of Congress' overall desire to protect health. That purpose
requires a flexible interpretation that both permits the FDA to take into
account the realities of human behavior and allows it, in appropriate cases,
to choose from its arsenal of statutory remedies ....

NOTES
L Action in Congress. In July 2004, the Senate passed legislation that would
have given FDA specific statutory authority to regulate cigarettes and chewing
tobacco. The legislation would not have put these products in the medical device

category, but would have added a new chapter to the FD&C Act dedicated to these
products, The legislation died in the House of Representatives. In March 2005, the
bill was reintroduced in the House (H.R 1376) and the Senate (S. 666), but it was
not been reported out of committee.
2, FDA Approval of Smoking Cessation Products. In 1984, FDA approved a
new drug application (NDA) for Nicorette chewing gum, which was indicated "as a
temporary aid to the cigarette smoker seeking to give up his or her smoking habit
while participating in a behavior modification program under medical or dental
supervision." Nicorette, originally approved as a prescription drug but now sold
over-the-counter, contains either 2 mg or 4 mg nicotine in each piece of chewing
gum. FDA considered, but ultimately rejected, establishing an over-the-counter
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monograph for smoking deterrent drug products. 58 Fed. Reg. 31236 (June 1, 1993).
Consequently, any drug product that is labeled, represented, or promoted as a
smoking deterrent is a new drug subject to the NDA process. 21 C.F.R. 310.544.
FDA has since approved NDAs for nicotine transdermal patches and nicotine
inhalers to aid in smoking cessation. The former are now available over~the~counter,
whereas the latter remain available only by prescription. In 2002, FDA found that
"nicotine lollipops" and "lip balm," promoted to assist smoking cessation were
intended for use as drugs. The FDA based its decision on the manufacturers' claims
that these products are a "convenient, tasty way" to replace cigarettes and helped
to decrease the "hand to mouth" fixation associated with smoking. FDA Talk Paper
No. T02-17, FDA Warns Sellers of Nicotine Lollipops & Lip Balm that their
Products are Illegal (Apr. 10, 2002).
3. FDA's Regulation of Other Tobacco and Nicotine Products. In December
2001, after the Supreme Court decided Brown & Williamson, a consortium of major
public health organizations submitted four citizen petitions requesting that the
agency regulate various tobacco and nicotine products marketed as safer than
traditional cigarettes or smokeless tobacco.
Reduced-Risk Cigarettes. One type of product addressed by the petitions was
reduced-risk cigarettes. Eclipse is a cigarette that primarily her.ts, rather than
burns, the tobacco. It claims a reduced risk of cancer, respiratory inflammation,
bronchitis, and emphysema as compared with other cigarettes. OMNI and Advance,
which use other technologies, claim reduced carcinogenicity. (OMNI cigarettes are
no longer commercially available.) The health organizations' petition urged FDA to
regulate these cigarettes as drugs or medical devices, asserting that the explicit
claims of risk reduction distinguished these products from the conventional cigarettes addressed in Brown & Williamson. FDA has not yet ruled on these petitions.
FDA Docket No. OlP-0570 (Eclipse); Docket No. OlP-0571 (OMNI and Advance).
Some of the comments filed by industry opposing the petitions acknowledged that a
cigarette making affirmative therapeutic claims, as opposed to risk-reduction claims,
would fall under FDA's jurisdiction. In other words, they acknowledged the continuing validity of the Fai1·fax Cigarettes decision, supra p. 78.
Nicotine Water. The manufacturer of this product attempted to market it as a
dietary supplement exempt from the FD&C Act's requirements for drugs. FDA
granted the health organizations' petition requesting that it regulate Nicotine
Water as a drug. FDA Docket No. OlP-0573. The agency concluded that the
manufacturer promoted Nicotine Water to treat or mitigate nicotine addiction. It
based this conclusion on statements on the manufacturer's website describing
Nicotine Water as a smoking cessation product that "contains the nicotine equivalent of 2 cigarettes" in one bottle of water and is "more effective than the Patch or
Gum using Less Nicotine." Upon FDA's conclusion, the manufacturer of Nicotine
Water then labeled its product a "homeopathic nicotinum formula."
Tobacco Lozenges. Ariva, a mint-flavored lozenge, contains tobacco powder
compressed into tablet form. The organizations petitioned FDA to classify tobacco
lozenges like Ariva as "drugs" or, alternatively, as "foods" containing a food
additive. FDA disagreed, concluding in part that Ariva was a "customarily marketed" tobacco product as defined by FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. See
Docket Nos. OlP-0572 and 02P-0075.
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The Public Health Service Act gives FDA jurisdiction to regulate
"biological products." Under the PHS Act, most biological products are
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subject to a regulatory regime similarly rigorous to that for drugs, including premarket review by FDA for safety and effectiveness. Section 262(i) of
the PHS Act defines "biological product" as follows:
In this section, the term "biological product" means a virus,
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.
This definition, with its list of examples and reference to "analogous"
products, is of a different character from the FD&C Act's product definitions. It presents its own interpretive problems.

David M. Dudzinski, Refiections on Historical,
Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of
Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and
Monoclonal Antibodies
60 Fooo & DRUG LAW JOURNAL 143 (2005).

. . . Concurrent with rising demand for treatments for the major
nineteenth century diseases, private entities began to manufacture vaccine
and antitoxin. Especially after the introduction of diphtheria antitoxin in
1894 from Germany, many small outfits run by pharmacies and physicians,
as well as two large pharmaceutical ventures, H.K. Mulford Co. and Parke
Davis, moved to produce antitoxins and supplant the government suppliers.
While Mulford and Parke Davis had devoted significant resources to quality
control and standardization of their antitoxin products, other smaller
concerns manufacturing antitoxins did not. Instances of unscrupulous
behavior by some smaller firms had previously resulted in a fake smallpox
vaccine being sold in the early 1800s. Instances of contamination of
commercial products also became a frequently recognized problem: large
outbreaks of tetanus allegedly occurred via contamination of diphtheria
antitoxin in the late 1890s and ~ontamination of smallpox vaccine in 1901.
Though numerous investigations revealed that the tetanus outbreak in
1901 was most likely not associated with the smallpox vaccine, the "report[s] did not silence public outcry." The major manufacturers of biologics, pitted against each other by the assignment of blame for the tetanus
outbreaks, found themselves under increasing scrutiny of the state governments and public. In response, the majors buried their disputes and
redoubled their efforts to attack the smaller biologics manufacturers who
were more likely to have "unsanitary and outmoded" facilities. Ultimately,
it was deaths of thirteen children from tetanus-contaminated vaccine that
"convinced Congress and the public that producing antitoxin or vaccine
was not a simple matter like weighing out a dose of a drug on a scale" and
provided an impetus for legislation.
Congress responded to the recent outbreaks as well as to the companies' lobbying by enacting the Biologics Act of 1902, the first enduring

F

HUMAN BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS

scheme of national regulation for any pharmaceutical product. The Biologics Act was groundbreaking in part because it set new precedents both in
terms of shifting from retrospective post-market to prospective pre-market
government review, and modifying the common law notion of punishing
conduct only of intentional or reckless actors, in favor of moving toward
pro-active safety measures for all entities.
The Biologics Act exerted jurisdiction over "viruses, therapeutic serums, toxins, antitoxins, or analogous products" as "biologics" that were
intended for tbe "prevention, and cure of diseases of man." Each of the
categories of regulated biologics represent immunologic agents, and Congress seemed to select tbese particular substances out of particular concern
for immunologic, allergenic, and (at least what was then perceived to be)
possibly contagious side effects. Viruses and toxins function to stimulate
development of active immunity and antibody production when introduced
into humans. Vaccines had been made for decades by exposing patients to a
relatively non-pathogenic strain of bacteria or killed or inactivated pathogens. Antitoxins and therapeutic serums confer passive immm.ity simply by
providing preformed antibodies, often developed by another animal like
horse or goat in response to the toxin. All of these products-even in their
final form after "manufacturing"-remained relatively crude mixtures; in
fact, most of the products regulated in 1902 had a purity less than 1%. The
Congressional concern for immunologic side effects was heightened especially in light of the biologics' animal origin and their parenteral, or
injectable route of administration; compared to oral administration, where
the digestive system provided some barriers protecting the body, injection
gave the biologics direct access to the inner body.
In 1963 United States v. Steinschreiber held blood plasma and
other components derived from processing of blood were subject to biologics
regulations as analogues to serum. 219 F. Supp. 373, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam). In contrast, in 1968
Blank v. United States held blood and red blood cells were drugs but
exempt from biologics regulation. 400 F.2d at 305 (5th Cir. 1968). Individual adjudications are a poor means to develop any comprehensive regulatory
scheme because of the lack of a guiding principle and the resultant
fragmented, confusing system. Recognizing that every "[f]ederal court
has held that blood is a drug" but diverged on the issue of blood as a
biologic, Congress unified the law by amending the PHSA § 351 to include
the classes of "blood, blood components or derivatives". Heart Disease,
Cancer, Stroke, and Kidney Disease Amendments [to the Public Health
Service Act] of 1970, 84 Stat. 1297, 1308 (Oct. 30, 1970) ...
The very notion of a biologic has changed many times over the last
century, and has deviated far from the root concern of grouping and
regulating non-human organism (virus, bacteria, or large animal) immunogenic molecules. By statute, biological products are now "defined" as
including viruses, therapeutic sera, toxins and antitoxins, vaccines, blood,
blood components or derivatives, allergenic products, any analogous products, and arsphenamines used treating disease. Though several of these
terms (e.g. therapeutic sera, antitoxin) lack crisp scientific meaning, no
actual definition of "biologic" is offered in the statute or its regulations.
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However, no definition is probably preferable to the alternative of
scientifically invalid definition, such as for virus, which is "interpreted to
be a product containing the minute living cause of an infectious disease and
includes but is not limited to filterable viruses, bacteria, rickettsia, fungi,
and protozoa." 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h)(l). It is also far from clear that the
earliest premise of biologics regulation was even internally consistent, as
many of the first substances considered to be biologics were not really
immunogenic per se, but designed to confer passive immunity. The more
modern additions to the family of designated biologics are also questionable. Arsphenamines, while toxic, do no more to affect the immune process
or cause immunogenic toxicities than do other well-known antibiotics and
anti-microbials. Moreover the "analogous" language greatly amplifies the
specter of biologics: for example, a product is analogous to 1) a virus if it is
merely prepared from any "potentially infectious agent", 2) a therapeutic
serum if it contains "some organic constituent" from blood (amino acids
and hormones, like insulin and human growth hormone, excepted), or 3) a
toxin or antitoxin if it addresses human disease "through a specific immune process." 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h)(5)(i)-(iii). When one considers that
virtually every chemical, including small molecules, can be an allergen to a
certain fraction of the population, and that "products analogous to blood"
has been theorized to encompass everything from the most well-characterized and well-purified serum protein all the way to whole organs, bewilderment about the definition of a biologic is understandable.

NOTES
1. Dual Classification. Because the definition of "biological products" refers
exclusively to articles "applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease
or condition of human beings," all biologics are simultaneously also drugs or
devices. This dual classification raises many issues regarding the appropriate
application of the requirements of PHS Act and the FD&C Act to biologics, as well
as the division of responsibility over these products among FDA's biologics, drug,
and device centers. These issues are addressed in Chapter VI.
2. Human Cellular and Tiwsue-Based Products. Human tissue products have
been used by doctors for decades. Skin, tendons, bones, heart valves, and corneas
that are damaged or diseased are replaced by tissues removed the body of a donor.
Semen, ova, and embryos are transferred to aid reproduction. Recent years have
seen an explosion of research into human cellular products for therapeutic pur~
poses, including somatic cell therapy products and gene therapy products. FDA
deems some human cellular and tissue~based products to be biologics, as well as
medical devices or drugs. The agency's regulation of these products is discussed in
Chapter VI, infra.

